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There is a rich literature on the circumstances under which the United Nations
Charter or specific Security Council resolutions authorize nations to use force
abroad, and there is a rich literature on the circumstances under which the U.S.
Constitution and statutory law allow the President to use force abroad. These are
largely separate areas of scholarship, addressing what are generally perceived to be
distinct legal issues. This Article, by contrast, considers these two bodies of law
together as they relate to the United States. In doing so, it makes three main contri-
butions. First, it demonstrates striking parallels between the structure of the interna-
tional and domestic legal regimes governing the use of force, and it explains how
this structure tends to incentivize unilateral action. Second, it theorizes that these
two bodies of law are interconnected in previously overlooked ways, such that how
the executive branch interprets law in one context can be and often is informed by
the other legal context. Third, it documents these interactions over time for several
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important components of the law on the use of force and shows that this dynamic
has played a significant role in justifying the practice-based expansion of unilateral
war powers. The Article concludes by arguing that both scholars and policymakers
seeking to shape the law on the use of force need to take better account of this
interactive dynamic.
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 691
I. PARALLELS AND INTERACTIONS IN THE TWO BODIES OF
LAW ON THE USE OF FORCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 694
A. DISPARITIES BETWEEN TEXT AND PRACTICE . . . . . . . . . . . 695
1. Domestic Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 695
2. International Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 698
B. Institutional Design and Practice over Time . . . . . . . . . 700
1. Inaction by Collective Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 701
2. Interpretive Opportunities for Unitary Actors . . . 703
3. Use of Practice in Legal Interpretation
over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 705
C. Interactions Between the Two Bodies of Law . . . . . . . 708
1. International Law as a Formal Influence on
Domestic Legal Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 709
2. The Transfusion of Domestic Interpretive
Principles into U.S. Understandings of
International Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 710
3. Legal Strength in One Context as a
Political Factor Relevant to Decisionmaking
in the Other Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 711
II. PROTECTING AMERICANS ABROAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 712
A. The Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries:
International Law Is Used to Strengthen the
President’s Constitutional Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 713
B. After the U.N. Charter: The United States Comes to
Interpret Article 51 in Ways That Track the
President’s Constitutional Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 718
III. SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS . . . . . . . . . . 724
A. The Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries:
Presidents Draw on International Law in
Asserting Constitutional Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 724
B. After the U.N. Charter: The United States Interprets
International Law Broadly at Times of Strong
Domestic Legal Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 727
IV. COLLECTIVE AND TREATY-BASED SECURITY . . . . . . . . . . . 732
A. Before the War Powers Resolution:
Presidents Invoke Treaties in Claiming
Expansive Constitutional Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 733
October 2016] PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS 691
B. After the War Powers Resolution: The Interplay
Between International and Domestic Law
Manifests Itself in Multiple Ways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 737
1. Initial Uses of Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 737
2. The Continuation of Hostilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 741
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE INTERACTIVE DYNAMIC . . . . . . . . . 745
A. Implications for War Powers Scholarship . . . . . . . . . . . 745
1. U.S. War Powers Scholarship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 745
2. International Legal Scholarship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 747
B. Implications for War Powers Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 749
1. Awareness of the Interactive Effect of
Authorizations to Use Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 749
2. Decisions on What to Put in
Authorizations for Uses of Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 751
3. Soft Law Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 753
4. Treatment of Practice in Legal Interpretation . . . . 755
C. Law and Presidential Decisionmaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 757
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 761
INTRODUCTION
Complaints about the rise of the “imperial Presidency” often
emphasize in particular the growth in the President’s control over the
use of military force.1 Even though the Constitution assigns to
Congress the power to declare war, as well as a variety of other
powers relating to war, presidents have on numerous occasions initi-
ated the use of military force without obtaining specific congressional
authorization.2 The scope of these unilateral presidential actions has
been especially significant since World War II.3
When he was a candidate for the presidency, Barack Obama sug-
gested that he might reverse this trend, contending that “[t]he
President does not have power under the Constitution to unilaterally
authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve stop-
ping an actual or imminent threat to the nation.”4 President Obama’s
1 E.g., ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY, at ix (1973)
(explaining that he would “devote[ ] special attention to the history of the war-making
power”).
2 See BARBARA SALAZAR TORREON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42738, INSTANCES OF
USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1798–2015 (2015), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/
natsec/R42738.pdf.
3 See Summary to TORREON, supra note 2 (noting that “[t]he majority of the instances
listed prior to World War II were brief Marine Corps or Navy actions” and that “[a]
number were engagements against pirates or bandits”).
4 Barack Obama’s Q&A, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 20, 2007, http://www.boston.com/
news/politics/2008/specials/CandidateQA/ObamaQA/.
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actions after taking office, however, reflect a more complicated pic-
ture. For example:
• In 2011, he directed the use of military force against Libya
without seeking congressional authorization, even though there was
no actual or imminent threat to the United States. In doing so, he
emphasized that the United States had “led an effort with our allies at
the United Nations Security Council to pass a historic resolution that
authorized a no-fly zone to stop the regime’s attacks from the air, and
further authorized all necessary measures to protect the Libyan
people.”5
• In 2013, he contemplated using force against Syria in response
to its use of chemical weapons, but this time he lacked any authoriza-
tion from the Security Council, and, at the last minute, he decided to
seek congressional approval. He explained that, although he believed
that he had the constitutional authority to take military action on his
own, he had concluded that “it was right, in the absence of a direct or
imminent threat to our security, to take this debate to Congress.”6
• Since late 2014, by contrast, President Obama has initiated the
ongoing use of military force against the Islamic State in Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS) without any action from the
Security Council and without any specific authorization from
Congress. In doing so, he has emphasized the consent of the Iraqi gov-
ernment, the international law right of self-defense, and preexisting
statutory authority relating to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
and the 2003 war in Iraq.7
Each of these examples, like all contemplated uses of force by the
United States abroad, implicate two bodies of law: international law
and domestic law. There is a rich literature on the circumstances
under which the United Nations Charter or specific Security Council
resolutions authorize nations to use force abroad, and there is a rich
literature on the circumstances under which the U.S. Constitution and
statutory law allows the President to use force abroad. Yet these are
discrete areas of scholarship, addressing what are generally perceived
to be different categories of legal doctrine. In this Article, by contrast,
5 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on
Libya (Mar. 28, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-
president-address-nation-libya.
6 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on
Syria (Sept. 10, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/10/remarks-
president-address-nation-syria.
7 See President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on ISIL (Sept. 10, 2014),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/statement-president-isil-1;
President Barack Obama, Statement by the President (Aug. 7, 2014), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/07/statement-president.
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we consider these two bodies of law together and, in doing so, we
explore a variety of underappreciated connections between them. We
make three main contributions.
First, we demonstrate striking parallels between the structure of
the international and domestic legal regimes governing the use of
force. In both regimes, the law as an originalist matter looks very dif-
ferent from how it is understood today in the United States. In both
regimes, moreover, the President has accrued power in the face of
inaction by institutions with collective action limitations (in particular,
the U.N. Security Council and Congress). Furthermore, the develop-
ment of both bodies of law has been practice-based; indeed the same
customary practices can influence the development of both interna-
tional law and domestic law, although not in precisely the same ways.
Second, we theorize that these two bodies of law are intercon-
nected in U.S. practice in previously overlooked ways. Our core
insight is that how the executive branch interprets law in one context
can be informed by the other legal context. We call this the interactive
dynamic. In particular, in justifying their decisions to use military
force, presidents often use a strong legal grounding in one domain to
help compensate for weaknesses in the other. Because past practice
plays an important role in the development of both bodies of law,
each incident in turn can become a precedent with future relevance.
Third, we document this interactive dynamic over time for three
important components of the law on the use of force. As we show, the
interactive nature of U.S. war powers is longstanding. It became espe-
cially pronounced after the United States ratified the U.N. Charter in
1945, but it is by no means simply a post-Charter phenomenon. This
phenomenon has important implications both for those who are con-
cerned that the President has come to exercise too free a hand in deci-
sions about the use of force and for those who advocate increased use
of either international law or domestic law to restrain such decisions.8
The Article pursues these themes as follows. Part I describes the
parallels between the international and domestic legal regimes gov-
erning the use of force and offers a theory of how these two bodies of
8 The focus here is on the international and domestic law governing whether military
force can be used rather than on the law governing how force can be used. That is, the
focus is on what is referred to in international law as jus ad bellum rather than on jus in
bello. Both the structure of decisionmaking concerning jus in bello and the relationship
between international law and domestic law in that area implicate distinct considerations
from those implicated by jus ad bellum. In addition, we focus almost exclusively on uses of
force that are overt rather than covert. Although international law on the use of force
applies to covert actions as well as overt ones, the differences in how covert actions are
carried out as a matter both of public accountability and of domestic law make assessing
the applicability of our arguments to covert action beyond the scope of this Article.
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law can interact in a way that favors the growth of presidential power
over time. Parts II, III, and IV explore this interactive dynamic
between international and domestic law with regard to the use of
force in three important contexts: (1) the defense of U.S. citizens
abroad; (2) self-defense against non-state actors; and (3) collective
and treaty-based uses of force. Part V considers the implications of
the interactive dynamic for both scholarship relating to war powers
and for the behavior of actors engaged in making war powers deci-
sions. It also reflects on the extent to which law, whether domestic or
international, matters for executive branch decisionmaking relating to
the use of force. Part VI concludes.
The focus of the Article is on how the U.S. executive branch
interprets international and domestic law on the use of force, not on
how these bodies of law should best be interpreted in the abstract. In
addition, we focus on interactions in legal argumentation and doctrine
without attempting to establish the extent to which those interactions
have a causal influence on presidential decisionmaking. The extent of
such a causal influence is uncertain, in part because of the difficulty of
disentangling legal considerations from political considerations, a
point that we revisit at the end of the Article. Moreover, different
presidents have varied in their approaches to law on the use of force,
including with regard to the extent to which they have been inclined
to draw upon the interactive dynamic in making claims about their
unilateral war authority. Thus, while our account suggests that the
interactive dynamic factors into presidential decisionmaking on the
use of force, we do not make strong claims of causality. Regardless of
the extent of its causal influence, the interplay between international
and domestic law that we document is an important and underap-
preciated theme in the history of U.S. war powers.
I
PARALLELS AND INTERACTIONS IN THE TWO BODIES OF
LAW ON THE USE OF FORCE
In both U.S. domestic law and international law, the practices
regarding the use of force are far more permissive than what seems to
be suggested by the relevant legal texts as originally understood. In
this Part, we begin by describing these disparities. We then discuss
parallels in the institutional structures that have helped give rise to
these disparities. Finally, we theorize that the gaps between text and
practice that have developed in the domestic and international con-
texts are not just similar, but also connected through an interactive
dynamic that has favored the growth of presidential war powers.
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A. Disparities Between Text and Practice
The executive branch today construes the law on the use of force
in ways that differ starkly from the apparent meanings of the gov-
erning legal texts, particularly as originally understood. Here, we
briefly set forth these disparities with regard to both domestic and
international law. The purpose of this section is only to describe these
disparities; much of the rest of the Article is devoted to exploring how
the disparities developed.
1. Domestic Law
The text of the Constitution gives Congress numerous war-
related powers, including the authority to “declare War” and “grant
Letters of Marque and Reprisal,”9 while making the President
“Commander in Chief” of the armed forces.10 While the President’s
role as Commander in Chief empowers him to direct the troops during
a war, this command function does not obviously encompass the deci-
sion whether to go to war in the first place.11 James Madison’s notes
from the Constitutional Convention suggest that the Framers intended
that Congress would decide when the United States went to war, with
the caveat that the President had the independent authority to defend
the United States from attacks.12 Most scholars think that, as a matter
of original meaning and intent, the Constitution did not authorize the
President to unilaterally initiate war.13 Moreover, although there is
more divergence on this issue, most scholars further conclude that the
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; see also id., cls. 11–14 (empowering Congress to “make
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water,” to “raise and support Armies,” to
“provide and maintain a Navy,” and to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation
of the land and naval Forces”).
10 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
11 In The Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton—normally a defender of robust
executive power—explained that the President’s Commander-in-Chief role “would
amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and
naval forces.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 386 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
12 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 318–19 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911) (recording an exchange in which the delegates voted to change
Congress’s power from “mak[ing] war” to “declar[ing] war,” thus “leaving to the Executive
the power to repel sudden attacks”). For discussion of other sources reflecting a similar
understanding during the time of the ratification debates, see Charles A. Lofgren, War-
Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672, 683–88
(1972).
13 See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1543,
1548 & n.19 (2002) (collecting sources). Among modern war powers scholars, the principal
exception to the view that Congress must authorize offensive war is Professor John Yoo.
E.g., John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original
Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167 (1996).
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Constitution’s original meaning and intent was to require congres-
sional authorization for most or all nondefensive uses of force that
might fall short of formal “war.”14 The practice of the early presidents
supports this understanding. For example, President Washington con-
sidered himself without authority to undertake “offensive expedi-
tion[s] of importance” against Indian tribes on the frontier without
congressional authorization.15 And, in response to attacks on U.S.
shipping by France, President Adams emphasized the need for con-
gressional authorization for anything more than limited measures of
self-defense.16
The executive branch today takes a far broader view of the
President’s independent constitutional authority. The Justice
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) has concluded that the
President can “take military action [abroad] for the purpose of pro-
tecting important national interests, even without specific prior
authorization from Congress.”17 OLC does not forswear a congres-
sional role in authorizing some uses of force, but it understands
Congress’s power to declare war simply to be a “possible constitution-
ally-based limit” such that prior congressional authorization “may” be
needed for “prolonged and substantial military engagements, typically
involving exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant risk over a
14 E.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF
VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 66–67 (1993); LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 7
(3d rev. ed. 2013); Jules Lobel, “Little Wars” and the Constitution, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 61,
69 (1995); Lofgren, supra note 12, at 697–99.
15 Letter from George Washington to Governor William Moultrie (Aug. 28, 1793), in 10
THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 366, 367 (Jared Sparks ed., New York, Harper &
Bros. 1847); see also Letter from Henry Knox, Sec’y of War, to Governor William Blount
(Nov. 26, 1792), in 4 THE TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES 220, 220–21
(Clarence Edwin Carter ed., 1936) (“[The President] does not conceive himself authorized
to direct offensive operations against the Chickamaggas. If such measures are to be
pursued they must result from the decisions of Congress who solely are vested with the
powers of War.”).
16 President John Adams, Special Session Message to the Senate and House of
Representatives (May 16, 1797), in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1897, at 233, 237 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896) [hereinafter
PRESIDENTIAL COMPILATION] (urging Congress to develop regulations “as will enable our
seafaring citizens to defend themselves against violations of the law of nations, and at the
same time restrain them from committing acts of hostility against the powers at war”); see
also Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry (May 17, 1798), in 21 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 461, 461–62 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1974) (“I am not
ready to say that [President Adams] has any other power than merely to employ the Ships
as Convoys with authority to repel force by force, (but not to capture) . . . . Any thing
beyond this . . . requires the sanction of that Department which is to declare or make
war.”).
17 Auth. to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C., 2011 WL 1459998, at *6 (O.L.C.
Apr. 1, 2011) (Memorandum from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, to the Attorney General).
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substantial period.”18 However these permissive interpretive claims
developed (an issue we return to in subsequent Parts of the Article), it
is clear that the President draws on them in practice. Looking at the
last few decades alone, the President has frequently initiated the use
of force abroad without prior congressional authorization, including
significant interventions in Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), Haiti
(1994), Kosovo (1999), and Libya (2011).19
A similar growth in presidential power despite the apparent con-
straints of text and intent also has occurred in connection with the
interpretation of statutes related to the use of force. The War Powers
Resolution is the most prominent such statute.20 Passed over
President Nixon’s veto in 1973, it sets explicit conditions and limits on
the President’s unilateral authority to use force in hostilities abroad.
Among other things, it instructs the President to withdraw U.S. troops
from any hostilities within sixty days unless the President has specific
statutory authorization to continue the hostilities.21 Yet since its pas-
sage, executive branch lawyers have been interpreting the resolution
in ways that whittle down its practical effect. In 2011, for example, the
Obama Administration concluded that U.S. participation in the
NATO bombing campaign against Libya did not amount to “hostili-
ties” for purposes of the Resolution.22 By contrast, where the execu-
tive branch is interpreting statutes that authorize presidential uses of
force, it tends to read these statutes expansively. Most recently, the
Obama Administration claimed that its ongoing intervention against
ISIL, initiated in 2014, is authorized by a combination of Congress’s
2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001 AUMF), which
was directed at the nations, organizations, and persons responsible for
18 Id. at *8.
19 See TORREON, supra note 2.
20 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2012).
21 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (providing for a thirty-day extension if necessary for the safe
withdrawal of U.S. troops).
22 Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th
Cong. 7–11 (2011) [hereinafter Koh Testimony] (statement of Harold H. Koh, Legal
Adviser, United States Department of State); UNITED STATES ACTIVITIES IN LIBYA 25
(2011), reprinted in Letter from Joseph E. Macmanus, Acting Assistant Sec’y, Dep’t of
State Bureau of Legislative Affairs, and Elizabeth L. King, Assistant Sec’y of Def. for
Legislative Affairs, Dep’t of Def., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, House of Representatives
(June 15, 2011), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/204673/united-states-
activities-in-libya-6-15-11.pdf. Although executive branch lawyers have sometimes
questioned the constitutionality of the 60-day provision, State Department Legal Adviser
Harold Koh insisted that “[w]e are not saying the War Powers Resolution is
unconstitutional or should be scrapped or that we can refuse to consult Congress.” Charlie
Savage & Mark Landler, White House Defends Continuing U.S. Role in Libya Operation,
N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/16/us/politics/
16powers.html?_r=0.
698 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:689
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,23 and Congress’s 2002
Authorization for the Use of Military Force in Iraq (2002 AUMF),
which empowered the President to “defend the national security of
the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq” in the
context of Saddam Hussein’s regime.24
2. International Law
An analogous disparity exists between the text of the U.N.
Charter as originally understood and the United States’ current legal
positions on the use of force. Prior to the adoption of the U.N.
Charter in 1945 (and particularly in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries), international law on the use of force had been broadly per-
missive.25 The U.N. Charter established much more restrictive legal
rules.
The core principle—set forth in Article 2(4)—is that state parties
“shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations.”26 Despite this general prohibition, the Charter
23 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). For
a consideration of this “creative and unexpected reading of the 2001 AUMF,” see Marty
Lederman, Tentative First Reactions to the 2001 AUMF Theory, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 11,
2014, 10:42 AM), http://justsecurity.org/14804/first-reactions-2001-aumf-theory/.
24 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002); see also Charlie Savage, Obama Sees Iraq Resolution as a
Legal Basis for Airstrikes, Official Says, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/09/13/world/americas/obama-sees-iraq-resolution-as-a-legal-basis-
for-airstrikes-official-says.html.
25 Around the time of the Constitution’s drafting, international law was shifting from
the principle that wars could only be fought for just causes towards the position that
nations had the right to go to war regardless of the reason. See IAN BROWNLIE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 13–18 (1963); YORAM DINSTEIN,
WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 78 (5th ed. 2011). After World War I, nations
attempted to restrict the legal right to wage offensive war through several important
multilateral treaties. See BROWNLIE, supra, at 55–96 (discussing the Covenant of the
League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the Saavedra Lamas Pact (the last two of
which the United States ratified)).
26 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4; see, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 25, at 264–68 (discussing the
drafting history and explaining that the specific enumerations within this provision were
intended “to give more specific guarantees to small states and . . . cannot be interpreted as
having a qualifying effect”). Besides being a binding treaty obligation, Article 2(4) is
widely understood today to reflect a principle of customary international law. See Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986
I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 187 (June 27) (noting that both the United States and Nicaragua viewed
Article 2(4) as reflecting customary international law and concluding that it is not only
customary international law but also possibly a jus cogens norm). See generally ROSALYN
HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL
ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 2 (1963) (arguing that the U.N. Security Council and
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makes lawful two specific types of uses of force abroad. First, Chapter
VII provides that the Security Council can authorize military actions
“as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security.”27 Second, Article 51 provides that “[n]othing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security.”28
Just as today the President uses force more broadly than the
Constitution’s text and original intent suggest is permissible without
congressional authorization, so too in international affairs does the
United States use force more broadly than the U.N. Charter’s text, as
originally understood, suggests may be done in the absence of Security
Council authorization. For example, the United States interprets “self-
defence if an armed attack occurs” broadly to authorize the use of
force abroad to protect citizens, to encompass acts that resemble
reprisals, and to justify forcible measures against non-state actors that
are connected in somewhat attenuated ways to initial aggressors.
Examples in the last few decades in which the United States has
invoked one or more of these interpretations include an air strike car-
ried out against Libya (1986), the intervention in Panama (1989),
bombing and missile strikes against Iraq (1993) and in Afghanistan/
Sudan (1998), and, more recently, uses of force undertaken as part of
its war on terror since September 11.29 The United States is, of course,
not the only actor to interpret the U.N. Charter’s provisions on the
use of force permissively—some other countries have done the
same,30 and so occasionally has the Security Council (with the support
of the United States).31 Yet as Christine Gray notes, “many of these
episodes” involving the United States “are unlike the vast mass of
state practice in that they do reflect differences between states as to
other organs are “vitally concerned with the development of customary international
law”).
27 U.N. Charter art. 42.
28 Id. art. 51. Articles 52 and 53 have additional provisions regarding action by regional
organizations.
29 See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 157, 195–209
(3d ed. 2008).
30 See, e.g., id. at 156–59, 195–96, 234–44 (discussing some such instances).
31 For example, the Security Council has sometimes interpreted its authority to extend
to matters that are largely internal to a single state, as when it authorized the use of “all
necessary means” in relation to Haiti in 1994. See JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 194 (2005). In addition, Security Council resolutions
can lend support to broad interpretations of Article 51. For an example, see S.C. Res. 1368
(Sept. 12, 2001), which is discussed infra note 151 and accompanying text.
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the applicable law” and the United States “takes a controversial posi-
tion as to the content of the law in order to justify its use of force.”32
In addition, just as the President interprets congressional statutes
in ways that favor presidential decisions to use force,33 so too in the
international context has the United States interpreted Security
Council resolutions broadly to favor its uses of force. For example, the
United States controversially asserted that the 2003 Iraq War was
authorized under international law by Security Council resolutions
passed in 1990 and 1991 in the context of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.34
B. Institutional Design and Practice over Time
How did these divergences from the original understanding of the
text develop? Although they have been increasing over time, they are
not new phenomena. Relatively early in U.S. history, executive branch
actors began undertaking military operations that looked more offen-
sive than defensive, such as the bombardment of Greytown,
Nicaragua in 1854.35 On the international side, similarly, “[t]hose who
regard the present as a period when the rules of international law con-
cerning the use of force by States are specially contested are probably
new to the field, or have short memories.”36 During the Cold War,
practice of the United States and other countries on the use of force
departed from the text of the U.N. Charter so substantially that it led
to a famous debate between Professors Thomas Franck and Louis
Henkin over whether Article 2(4) was dead.37
There are common structural explanations for at least a substan-
tial proportion of the divergences between text and practice in
domestic law and in international law, at least as understood by the
United States. Broadly speaking, in both contexts, we see that
authority over offensive uses of force is entrusted to decisionmaking
bodies subject to collective action limitations (Congress and the
Security Council) and that power over defensive uses of force is
32 GRAY, supra note 29, at 11–12.
33 See supra notes 20–24 and accompanying text.
34 See William H. Taft & Todd F. Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq, and International Law,
97 AM. J. INT’L L. 557 (2003); see also GRAY, supra note 29, at 354–66.
35 See infra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
36 James Crawford, Foreword to JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY,
AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES, at xii, xii (2004).
37 Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing the Use
of Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 809 (1970); Louis Henkin, The Reports of the Death
of Article 2(4) Are Greatly Exaggerated, 65 AM. J. INT’L L. 544 (1971). Despite disagreeing
with Franck about the state of Article 2(4), Henkin said that “[i]t is difficult to quarrel with
Dr. Franck’s diagnosis of the ills of the Charter” including “the disposition of nations to
take law into their own hands and distort and mangle it to their own purpose.” Henkin,
supra, at 544.
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entrusted to unitary actors (the President and individual nations), at
least until the collective body acts. This creates an institutional struc-
ture that allows the unitary actors to construe their authority broadly,
especially given limited judicial review in the context of the use of
force. Then, over time, a practice-based approach to legal interpreta-
tion helps legitimize moves away from the original allocations of
power in favor of greater allocations of power to these unitary actors.
We elaborate on these points below, and we also discuss how they
manifest themselves somewhat differently in domestic and interna-
tional law.
1. Inaction by Collective Actors
The Constitution and the U.N. Charter appear to entrust deci-
sions about offensive uses of force to multimember decision-makers:
Congress, in the case of the Constitution, and the U.N. Security
Council, in the case of the U.N. Charter. But both of these institutions
face collective action and veto constraints that reduce the likelihood
that they will (1) authorize uses of force ex ante and (2) punish unau-
thorized uses of force ex post.
In domestic law, the congressional default is inaction because leg-
islation requires a majority vote of its members in both houses, as well
as the successful surmounting of other procedural barriers. Ex ante,
this means that it can be difficult for the President to get Congress to
authorize uses of force that the President believes are desirable.
Although sometimes Congress will take action and authorize uses of
military force, as with the 2001 AUMF that followed the events of
September 11, at other times—such as in connection with President
Clinton’s use of force in the Kosovo conflict in 1999—Congress may
not muster the votes to legislate with regard to the use of force.38 Ex
post, however, the default toward inaction means that Congress as a
body will have considerable difficulty in condemning presidential
action once taken. As political scientists William Howell and Jon
Pevehouse put it, “[a]ll of the institutional features of Congress that
impede consensus building around a military venture ex ante also
make it equally if not more difficult, later, to dismantle an operation
38 A bill that would have directed the President to cease military operations was
defeated in the House of Representatives on a vote of 139 to 290, and a bill that would
have authorized the Kosovo operation was defeated in the House on a tie vote of 213 to
213. See RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33532, WAR POWERS
RESOLUTION: PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE 5 (2012), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/
RL33532.pdf.
702 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:689
that is up and running.”39 Indeed, the procedural threshold required
for Congress to condemn presidential action is higher than the
threshold for supporting presidential action. Such condemnation
would potentially require either the two-thirds support of the mem-
bers in both houses needed to override a presidential veto or the
majority of the House of Representatives and the two-thirds majority
in the Senate needed for impeachment.40
Turning to the international sphere, the U.N. Security Council
also has a strong institutional default in favor of inaction.41 To
authorize the use of force under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the
Security Council needs the affirmative votes of nine out of the fifteen
state members, and a veto can be exercised by any of the permanent
five (P5) members—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and
the United States.42 History bears out that this is a high bar. Between
the Korean War and the end of the Cold War, the Security Council
almost never authorized the use of force under Chapter VII, in part
because of frequent Soviet vetoes.43 Authorizations have proved more
frequent since, but rarely in contexts involving the use of force against
allies of P5 members. For example, it was clear in 2012 that any
attempt to get a Security Council resolution authorizing the use of
force against the Assad regime in Syria would be vetoed by Russia.44
Yet just as the structure of the Security Council makes it difficult for it
to authorize the use of force ex ante, so too does it make it difficult to
condemn the use of force ex post. When it has done so, as in the wake
of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990,45 it is because no P5 member has
chosen to veto the resolution.
39 WILLIAM G. HOWELL & JON C. PEVEHOUSE, WHILE DANGERS GATHER:
CONGRESSIONAL CHECKS ON PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS 8 (2007).
40 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3, 7. This structural requirement is made even stronger in
practice by the party system, since “the political interests of elected officials generally
correlate more strongly with party than with branch.” Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H.
Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2324, 2359–60 (2006).
41 See, e.g., Vaughan Lowe et al., Introduction to THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL AND WAR: THE EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT AND PRACTICE SINCE 1945, at 1, 50
(Vaughan Lowe et al. eds., 2008).
42 See U.N. Charter art. 27, ¶ 3.
43 GRAY, supra note 29, at 255–59 (“The action against Korea in 1950 was the only use
of force authorized by the Security Council during the Cold War in response to a breach of
the peace by a state.”).
44 See, e.g., Colum Lynch, Russia, China Veto U.N. Sanctions Resolution on Syria,
WASH. POST (July 19, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/new-
shelling-pessimism-in-syria-a-day-after-bomb-kills-top-government-aides/2012/07/19/
gJQAJzszvW_story.html (describing Russia’s and China’s veto of a proposed resolution
under Chapter VII imposing sanctions and noting their asserted concerns that this
resolution might somehow implicitly justify military intervention).
45 S.C. Res. 660 (Aug. 2, 1990); S.C. Res. 678 (Nov. 29, 1990).
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2. Interpretive Opportunities for Unitary Actors
Congress’s collective action limitations allow presidents to push
the boundaries of their legal authority under domestic law. As a uni-
tary actor relative to Congress, the President can more readily take
action.46 Of course, where the President can get the timely support of
Congress, there may be an incentive to do so in the interests of both
legal form and political cover. Conversely, sometimes the President
will clearly already have the authority under constitutional or statu-
tory law to use force. But incentives to push the boundaries arise in
the not infrequent situations in which the President thinks that (1) the
use of force is desirable, (2) the legal authority to use force without
further congressional action is not clearly established, and (3) further
congressional action is not likely to be forthcoming, is not likely to be
timely, or is likely to contain problematic conditions. Given the third
factor, the President faces conflicting incentives from the first two fac-
tors. This tension sometimes cannot be reconciled, in which case the
President must choose between the use of force and compliance with
the best reading of the law. Alternatively, the President may attempt
to reduce this tension either by structuring the use of force to be more
in compliance with the legal framework or by advocating a more per-
missive interpretation of existing law. If the President advocates a
more permissive interpretation, there is little risk that Congress will
legislate in condemnation of the action because of Congress’s collec-
tive action constraint.
A similar incentive structure applies in the international legal
context, particularly with regard to the actions of the United States. A
nation often will have a legal and political interest in having the
Security Council authorize uses of force that it views as desirable.47
But where an authorization is not obtainable due to the Security
Council’s collective action constraints and the nation does not have a
clear right to act in self-defense under international law, the nation
46 See generally Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of
Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132 (1999).
47 In some instances, however, unitary actors will not want to seek authorization,
because they may hope to set a precedent in favor of unilateral authority, wish to avoid
setting a precedent that might suggest that they need authorization, or be concerned that
an affirmative failure to get permission will be more politically (and perhaps legally) costly
than the mere absence of permission. See Edward T. Swaine, The Political Economy of
Youngstown, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 263, 304–07 (2010) (making an argument along the latter
lines with regard to the war powers in U.S. domestic law). On the international front, in
2003 the Bush Administration withdrew a proposed Security Council resolution that would
have authorized the use of force against Iraq after it became apparent that one or more
permanent members would likely veto any authorization. See RAYMOND W. COPSON,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31715, IRAQ WAR: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES OVERVIEW 3
(2003), http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL31715.pdf.
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faces a tension between its desire for military action and its interest in
legality. In these cases, the nation might choose to pursue one or the
other of these interests or try to reconcile the two by reshaping its
intended use of force or interpreting existing international law to be in
its favor.
For the United States, the incentives to interpret international
law liberally in its favor are especially strong. First, because it is a P5
member, the United States knows that it can always veto a proposed
Security Council resolution condemning its use of force. Second, as
Matt Waxman notes, “[s]tates like the United States, with the strength
to defeat or deter developing threats and a willingness to pursue
interventionist policies, will incline towards doctrinal formulas that
permit discretion.”48
In theory, these structural incentives could be checked by judicial
review. Currently, however, there is no meaningful judicial review
available either regarding the President’s authority to use force under
domestic law or the United States’ authority to use force under inter-
national law. On the domestic side, U.S. courts have invoked jus-
ticiability doctrines or high levels of deference in cases challenging the
President’s authority to use force, both under the Constitution and
with regard to the War Powers Resolution.49 On the international
side, the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) has sometimes
addressed the legality of uses of force—most importantly in a case
brought by Nicaragua against the United States in the 1980s.50 But the
United States has resisted the institutional authority of the I.C.J. in
this context, and the I.C.J. no longer has general compulsory jurisdic-
tion over the United States.51
48 Matthew C. Waxman, Regulating Resort to Force: Form and Substance of the UN
Charter Regime, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 151, 168 (2013).
49 E.g., Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133, 135 (1st Cir. 2003) (Iraq); Campbell v. Clinton, 203
F.3d 19, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Kosovo); Kucinich v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 110, 125
(D.D.C. 2011) (Libya); cf., e.g., Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the
Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1197 (2006) (“In matters implicating foreign
affairs and national security, for example, judicial review of executive branch statutory
interpretation is extremely infrequent.” (citing Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,
660–61 (1981))).
50 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (June 27).
51 In 1985, in response to the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) decision to exercise
jurisdiction over the case brought by Nicaragua, the United States withdrew its consent to
the I.C.J.’s general compulsory jurisdiction. See United States: Department of State Letter
and Statement Concerning Termination of Acceptance of I.C.J. Compulsory Jurisdiction,
24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985).
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3. Use of Practice in Legal Interpretation over Time
Past practice plays an important role in legal interpretation in
both domestic and international law on the use of force. When unitary
actors push the boundaries of their legal authority, they therefore are
simultaneously creating precedents that become part of legal dis-
course going forward.52 As these precedents build up, they then have
the effect of expanding the actual or perceived scope of legal authority
for the unitary actors.53 This is true despite certain doctrinal safe-
guards, described below, that are designed to identify what practice
counts and when it does so.
The classic articulation of the role of historical practice in U.S.
domestic constitutional law comes from Justice Frankfurter’s concur-
ring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Steel Co. v. Sawyer.54 Frankfurter
emphasized the need to look at the “gloss which life has written upon”
the words of the Constitution, explaining that “a systematic,
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the
Congress and never before questioned . . . mak[es] as it were such
exercise of power part of the structure of our government.”55 As one
of us has shown in work with Trevor Morrison, reliance on historical
practice in the area of separation of powers has a tendency to favor
the growth of executive power over time, especially if congressional
acquiescence is measured by mere inaction rather than affirmative
acceptance.56 Moreover, the executive branch is more likely than the
judiciary to credit historical practice, not only favoring it as a tool of
construction but also often setting a low bar in finding congressional
acquiescence and construing past practices aggressively in its own
favor.57
52 Cf. ALVAREZ, supra note 31, at 194 (“While some would contend that the Council’s
enforcement measures do not constitute ‘precedents’ in the sense established by common
law courts, those familiar with the path dependencies evident in most organizations know
that prior practices are often a reliable guide to future actions.”).
53 Cf. id. (arguing that the U.N. Security Council is able to cross lines more easily by
relying on prior enforcement actions).
54 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
55 Id. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For recent endorsements by the Supreme
Court of the relevance of historical practice to discerning the separation of powers, see
Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014), and Zivotofsky v.
Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2091 (2015).
56 Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 440–44 (2012).
57 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 TEX. L.
REV. 773, 828–29 (2014) (noting that Executive Branch lawyers have a tendency to over-
claim about past practice); Jean Galbraith, International Law and the Domestic Separation
of Powers, 99 VA. L. REV. 987, 1043–45 (2013) (“[T]he strength and applicability of past
practices are often overstated by supporters of increased presidential power.”).
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In the use of force context, the executive branch relies mainly on
past practice to bridge the tensions between the principle of fidelity to
law on the one hand and the existing disparities between text and
practice on the other hand. OLC uses “historical precedents” as “the
framework” for its constitutional analysis on the use of force.58
Although practice does not always favor executive power (for
example, the congressional authorization for the first Gulf War can be
seen as a marker in favor of the need for such authorizations for major
interventions), its overall direction tends to do so.59 The executive
branch also emphasizes past practice when engaging in statutory inter-
pretation on the use of force. Thus in making his argument that U.S.
participation in the 2011 NATO bombings carried out in Libya did not
constitute “hostilities” for purposes of the War Powers Resolution,
State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh emphasized that “suc-
cessive Congresses and Presidents have opted for a process through
which the political branches have worked together to flesh out the
law’s meaning over time.”60 This emphasis on historical practice both
helps provide a domestic law foundation for presidential actions
relating to war and, over time, tends to further the development of the
law in favor of stronger executive power.
Past practice also matters for international law, both with regard
to treaty interpretation and customary international law. As to treaty
interpretation, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties pro-
vides that one factor to take into account is the subsequent practice of
parties to the treaty.61 As to customary international law, it is mea-
58 Auth. to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C., 2011 WL 1459998, at *6 (O.L.C.
Apr. 1, 2011); see also id., at *7 (emphasizing the “historical gloss”); Jane E. Stromseth,
Understanding Constitutional War Powers Today: Why Methodology Matters, 106 YALE
L.J. 845, 872 (1996) [hereinafter Stromseth, Why Methodology Matters] (reviewing LOUIS
FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (1995)) (noting that “Presidents and their advisers
regularly invoke historical practice as a means of validating presidential power to commit
U.S. forces to hostilities”).
59 See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 56, at 442–46 (explaining factors that make
expansion of executive power more probable than contraction).
60 Koh Testimony, supra note 22, at 13.
61 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(b), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 (providing that “[t]here shall be taken into account . . . any subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation”); see also Int’l Law Comm’n, Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent
Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties: Text of Draft Conclusions 1–5
Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting Committee at the Sixty-Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/L.813, at 2 (2013) (noting, in Draft Conclusion 4(3), that “conduct by one or more
parties in the application of the treaty, after its conclusion” can constitute a supplementary
means of interpretation under article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).
October 2016] PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS 707
sured by the presence of a “general practice accepted as law.”62
Unlike in the domestic law context, where the executive branch is the
primary shaper of past practice, the United States is merely one of
many nations involved in creating practice. Because of this, its overall
influence on practice—and thus on international law—is much more
limited.
Nonetheless, in the use of force context U.S. practice plays an
outsized role. First, and most obviously, it shapes how the United
States understands international law. In defining and articulating its
positions on international law, the United States places far more
emphasis on its own past practices than it does on those of other coun-
tries. Second, as the most important military power in the U.N.
Charter era, the United States has contributed to overall state practice
in ways that have helped shape international law more generally.
After the September 11 attacks, for example, commentators noted a
shift in understandings about when nations could use force against
non-state actors located on the territory of other nations, with this
shift based on the U.S. response to September 11 and the acquies-
cence of other nations in this response.63 In addition, the United
States, through the executive branch, is an influential member of the
U.N. Security Council, and it often plays a leading role in helping to
formulate that body’s positions concerning the use of force.64 Finally,
regardless of whether the practice of the United States and like-
minded countries has redefined international law, this practice can
reduce objection to the illegality of further similar actions, as, over
time, the claim that international law permits these actions becomes
increasingly viewed as a competing legal position rather than as out-
right illegality. Taken together, these considerations help explain how
the United States has moved substantially away from the original
understanding of the text of the U.N. Charter, and yet still considers
itself operating under the legal regime created by the Charter.
62 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055.
63 See, e.g., TOM RUYS, “ARMED ATTACK” AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER:
EVOLUTIONS IN CUSTOMARY LAW AND PRACTICE 439–43 (2010) (discussing the different
ways commentators have interpreted the precedential ramifications of the U.S. response to
the September 11 attacks); see also Monica Hakimi, Defensive Force Against Non-State
Actors: The State of Play, 91 INT’L L. STUD. 1, 7–9 (2015) (analyzing the U.S. response to
the September 11 attacks in the context of the loosening prohibition against using
defensive force against non-state actors).
64 See Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the
Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 369, 398 (2005) (noting that
the “permanent members—and in particular the US—can of course control [the Security
Council] much more easily than the typical processes of international law-making and
enforcement”).
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C. Interactions Between the Two Bodies of Law
So far, we have focused on showing parallels between the
domestic and the international contexts regarding the law on the use
of force. In what follows, we go a step further and suggest that, for the
United States, these two contexts present an interactive dynamic in
which presidents draw on legal support in one sphere, international or
domestic, to help compensate—at least rhetorically—for weak legal
support in the other. In this section, we identify ways in which this
dynamic works and explain how, given the role of practice in legal
interpretation, it can influence doctrine over time.
That international and domestic political considerations can
affect one another is already recognized. The political scientist Robert
Putnam, for example, describes international negotiations as a “two-
level game” in which the President (like other heads of state) must
both achieve an international agreement and persuade domestic
ratifiers and implementers to accept it.65 Crucially, the constraints
faced by participants at one level, and the strategies they pursue, can
affect what happens at the other level. Thus, international negotiators
may factor domestic constraints into their decisions, or domestic
public opinion may shift in response to the international negotia-
tions.66 While the specifics of Putnam’s model do not directly translate
to the war powers context, which centers around international con-
frontation rather than international agreement, the idea of interac-
tions between the two levels may help explain political calculations in
this context. For example, Jide Nzelibe draws on this insight in sug-
gesting that a presidential decision to seek congressional authorization
for the use of force sends “a costly signal to the foreign adversary
about the United States’ resolve to prosecute the conflict.”67
Our approach differs from Putnam’s and from Nzelibe’s because
our emphasis is on the development of legal doctrine. Although we
are interested in how law in one context affects the political calcula-
tions that the President makes with regard to the other context, our
core focus is on how law in one context affects the doctrinal claims
made by the executive branch in the other context. Because of the
role that practice plays in legal interpretation, the effects of these doc-
trinal claims can linger long after their initial use, as they become
precedents cited by later decision-makers. In other words, each
65 See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427, 436–38 (1988) (describing this phenomenon).
66 See id. at 455 (describing ways in which international pressures can “reverberate”
among the domestic politics of negotiating states).
67 Jide Nzelibe, A Positive Theory of the War-Powers Constitution, 91 IOWA L. REV.
993, 998 (2006).
October 2016] PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS 709
instance of the interactive dynamic can not only influence doctrinal
claims at the time it occurs, but also help shape doctrine going for-
ward. Moreover, unlike with Putnam’s model, in which a President
ultimately needs support at both the international and domestic levels,
we hypothesize that in justifying decisions to use military force, presi-
dents are able to trade off support in one context to help compensate
for the lack of support in the other context. Finally, as the phrase
“interactive dynamic” indicates, our approach, unlike Putnam’s, is
focused not on a single decision point but rather on the dynamic
effects over time.
The interactive dynamic can manifest itself in at least three ways,
which we categorize below. Although these ways are conceptually dis-
tinct, they can overlap and may be difficult to disentangle in practice.
1. International Law as a Formal Influence on
Domestic Legal Doctrine
First, international law can play a formal role in the interpreta-
tion of U.S. domestic law. This mechanism, which has received some
scholarly attention (especially as it concerns the domestic relevance of
Security Council authorizations of force),68 can take a variety of
forms. Perhaps most importantly, presidents may view international
law as giving them direct domestic legal mandates, or potentially
direct domestic legal constraints. Thus, long before the adoption of
the U.N. Charter, presidents relied on treaties as support for using
force without congressional authorization,69 and, relatedly, on the
President’s constitutional authority to “take Care that the Laws be
68 See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, UN Police Action in Lieu of War: “The
Old Order Changeth,” 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 63 (1991) (examining the ways in which U.S.
membership in the United Nations has affected discussions about war powers); Michael J.
Glennon, The Constitution and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 85 AM. J. INT’L
L. 74 (1991) (arguing that under U.S. law, the President is not authorized to use military
force by either the U.N. Charter or the United Nations Participation Act); David Golove,
From Versailles to San Francisco: The Revolutionary Transformation of the War Powers, 70
COLO. L. REV. 1491, 1492 (1999) (explaining the constitutional foundations for the view
that the President “ha[s] constitutional authority to use armed force once the Security
Council has authorized an enforcement action”); Thomas H. Lee, International Law and
Institutions and the American Constitution in War and Peace, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 291
(2013) (arguing that presidents have drawn on Security Council resolutions and other
forms of international law in asserting constitutional authority to use force); Jane E.
Stromseth, Rethinking War Powers: Congress, the President, and the United Nations, 81
GEO. L.J. 597 (1993) [hereinafter Stromseth, Rethinking War Powers] (analyzing
congressional and presidential roles in authorizing the use of military force in response to
Security Council requests for collective action); see also Galbraith, supra note 57, at
1019–26 (arguing that international law has shaped the constitutional separation of powers
regarding the use of military force).
69 See infra Section IV.A.
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faithfully executed”70 as a justification for implementing treaties or
carrying out certain uses of force that were authorized or encouraged
under customary international law. In addition, presidents may argue
that the international legal context changes the factual setting in a way
that affects their domestic legal obligations. For example, the exis-
tence of a U.N. Security Council resolution could be thought to
change war to a “police action” or to enhance the legally relevant
interests of the United States in a particular use of force. Notably, this
mechanism only operates in one direction—U.S. domestic law does
not (and, analytically, should not) play a formal role in the interpreta-
tion of international law on the use of force.
2. The Transfusion of Domestic Interpretive Principles into U.S.
Understandings of International Law
Second, the close parallels between international and domestic
law on the use of force may encourage executive branch actors to
draw on interpretive principles from one body of law in interpreting
the other. In the domestic context, for example, executive branch law-
yers are accustomed to emphasizing U.S. past practice, to interpreting
statutes energetically, and to deeming use of force questions inappro-
priate for courts. It may be natural for these lawyers to apply these
same principles to the international legal context, whether as a matter
of ingrained habit or of conscious belief in their normative
appropriateness.
Direct evidence of such interpretive moves is hard to come by, as
the public positions on international law put forward by the executive
branch rarely rely explicitly on U.S. domestic precedents. But the exis-
tence of these transfusions is supported by indirect evidence, including
comments by former lawyers in the executive branch as to how U.S.
domestic legal principles do or should inform international legal
ones.71 While the transfusion of interpretive principles could theoreti-
cally happen in either direction, in practice executive branch actors
are much more likely to borrow domestic legal principles in their
70 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
71 See, e.g., Abram Chayes, Comment, A Common Lawyer Looks at International Law,
78 HARV. L. REV. 1396, 1403–04, 1409–11 (1965) (suggesting that the separation of powers
on the use of force in the domestic context is a helpful model for thinking about the
international legal context); see also MICHAEL P. SCHARF & PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING
FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES OF CRISIS: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE
DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER 82–85 (2010) (reproducing account of former State
Department Legal Adviser Abraham Sofaer, in which he referenced the Chayes comment,
and paid particular attention to U.S. past practice).
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international legal interpretation than the other way around.72 This
could be because executive branch lawyers are more familiar with
U.S. domestic law to begin with, or because the formal mechanisms of
legal influence described above offer more direct ways for bringing
international legal principles into domestic law.
3. Legal Strength in One Context as a Political Factor Relevant to
Decisionmaking in the Other Context
Third, the strength of legal justification in one body of law could
potentially affect the President’s incentives to interpret the other body
of law expansively. The reason stems from the connection between
legality and political acceptance. The more overall international and
domestic political pressure there is against a use of force, the less
likely a President is to undertake it. Strong legality in one context
reduces political pressure within that context: At a minimum, oppo-
nents cannot include convincing legal objections among their political
ones, and at a maximum—where there is a congressional authoriza-
tion or a Security Council resolution—this legality stems from sup-
portive votes cast by key political actors. Accordingly, strong legality
in one context has the potential to increase the President’s willingness
to take risks in the other context, including through controversial legal
interpretations.73 (A number of possible examples of this phenom-
enon, including President Truman’s use of force against North Korea
in 1950 and President Obama’s use of force against Libya in 2011, are
described in subsequent Parts of the Article.) Conversely, where the
President is on relatively weak grounds in both international and
domestic law—as President Obama likely would have been in 2013 if
he had used force against the Assad regime in Syria in response to its
use of chemical weapons74—he may be less willing to take action in
reliance on controversial legal positions. Because executive branch
72 See JAMES CRAWFORD, CHANCE, ORDER, CHANGE: THE COURSE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 185, at 152 (2014) (observing that international lawyers “are
commonly municipal lawyers first, and bring to the international sphere a collection of
presumptions and perceptions as part of our training”).
73 In addition, international legality may increase political support domestically, in line
with Putnam’s observation that “messages from abroad can change minds [and] move the
undecided.” Putnam, supra note 65, at 455.
74 See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Legality of Intervention in Syria in Response to
Chemical Weapon Attacks, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. INSIGHTS (Aug. 30, 2013), http://
www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/21/legality-intervention-syria-response-chemical-
weapon-attacks (noting that intervention by the United States would be difficult to justify
as self-defense based on Article 51); Oona Hathaway & Scott Shapiro, Attacking Syria
Without the U.N.’s Go-Ahead Would Be a Mistake, WASH. POST (Aug. 28, 2013), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/attacking-syria-without-the-uns-go-ahead-would-be-a-
mistake/2013/08/28/c73e784a-0f61-11e3-bdf6-e4fc677d94a1_story.html (arguing that the
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actors are unlikely to be explicit about these doctrinal trade-offs, evi-
dence of this mechanism will mostly be circumstantial.75 Some of the
executive branch’s argumentation and decisionmaking concerning the
use of force, however, has been at least suggestive of this
phenomenon.
* * *
The next three Parts explore the interplay between international
law and domestic law in U.S. practice on the use of force. Each Part
focuses on the development of a different aspect of doctrine over
time. Part II focuses on the defense of citizens as a justification for
uses of force; Part III focuses on self-defense against non-state actors
operating from the territory of a third state; and Part IV focuses on
authorizations from a treaty or from an international organization cre-
ated by a treaty. These are not the only important doctrines relating to
the use of force—for example, we do not discuss anticipatory self-
defense or principles of necessity and proportionality, and we cover
humanitarian intervention only as it overlaps with the issues on which
we focus. Overall, however, the three examples encompass most of
the significant overt uses of force by the United States since the U.N.
Charter, and many earlier ones as well. As we show, the interactive
dynamic is important—indeed, we believe essential—to under-




Early in U.S. history, there appears to have been a general
assumption that, as Commander in Chief, the President had some uni-
lateral power to use force to protect Americans abroad, but there was
significant uncertainty about how far the President could go. In partic-
ular, there was uncertainty about whether and to what extent the
President could use force to carry out reprisals or to obtain redress
after an attack on U.S. citizens or their property. Presidents who
asserted broad constitutional authority in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries used international law both as a formal influence
on domestic doctrine and as political justification. Following the adop-
tion of the U.N. Charter, the interactive dynamic came to work in the
United States should refrain from using military force in Syria because doing so would
violate international law).
75 Syria is an unusual example in which there is some direct evidence of this
mechanism. See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
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other direction, as presidents interpreted Article 51 to broadly
authorize uses of force by the United States in defense of American
citizens abroad.
A. The Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries:
International Law Is Used to Strengthen the President’s
Constitutional Authority
After the United States developed a navy in the early nineteenth
century, it was increasingly used to protect Americans and their prop-
erty abroad.76 In justifying the power of the executive branch to
undertake these actions, presidents frequently emphasized principles
of international law—both as political factors justifying their actions
and as formal influences on domestic doctrine. In particular, they
cited the right that nations had under international law to defend their
citizens, and in some situations they also drew upon the distinction in
international law between nations and non-state actors.
It became increasingly common, for example, for the U.S. navy to
take military action in response to attacks on U.S. merchant vessels.
As an illustration, in 1831, President Andrew Jackson directed the
USS Potomac to seek restitution in Sumatra after villagers in Quallah
Battoo had attacked a U.S. merchant vessel engaged in the pepper
trade and killed several members of its crew. After arriving in early
1832, the U.S. forces destroyed the village and killed between 100 and
150 Sumatrans.77 Jackson suggested that the use of force had been
proper as a “chastisement” because the villagers were “a band of law-
less pirates” rather than “members of a regular government, capable
of maintaining the usual relations with foreign nations.”78 Some news-
papers questioned Jackson’s authority to take such action without
congressional authorization.79
76 In an early instance, Thomas Jefferson sent several ships to the Mediterranean to
defend U.S. commercial ships from attacks by the Barbary Pirates. See ABRAHAM D.
SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 208–16 (1976);
Montgomery N. Kosma, Our First Real War, 2 GREEN BAG 2d 169 (1999). For incidents in
the first half of the nineteenth century involving attacks by non-state actors, see infra
Section III.A.
77 See MAX BOOT, THE SAVAGE WARS OF PEACE: SMALL WARS AND THE RISE OF
AMERICAN POWER 47–48 (2002) (recounting the attack in Sumatra as well as the resulting
political and legal controversy); HENRY BARTHOLOMEW COX, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: 1829–1901, at 52–54 (1984) (same).
78 President Andrew Jackson, Fourth Annual Message (Dec. 4, 1832), in 2
PRESIDENTIAL COMPILATION, supra note 16, at 591, 596.
79 See SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 53 (recounting newspapers’ criticism of the
Jackson Administration’s actions).
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A much-publicized exercise of the power to protect American cit-
izens occurred in 1853.80 Martin Koszta, a Hungarian by birth, had
been active in efforts to detach Hungary from the Austro-Hungarian
empire. After emigrating to the United States and initiating a process
of naturalization to become a U.S. citizen, he made a business trip to
Turkey. While there, he was apprehended by the Austrian military and
placed in chains on an Austrian ship docked in Turkey. A U.S. navy
captain stationed in Turkey then threatened to open fire on the
Austrians if Koszta was not released. After the matter was resolved
without force, the Austrians filed a protest with the U.S. government,
claiming that the captain had violated international law. Specifically,
the Austrians complained that the threat was “an act of war” and that
only a sovereign, not a mere commander, could initiate a war under
international law.81 They cited the Declare War Clause of the Consti-
tution in support of this argument, suggesting that the sovereign for
the United States in this matter was Congress.82
In response, the Secretary of State defended the actions of the
navy captain. He “yield[ed] a ready assent to that part of [the
Austrian] note relative to the war-making power,” but then relied on
international law to claim that Austria rather than the United States
had been the aggressor.83 Because Koszta was in the process of
becoming a U.S. citizen, the United States “had, therefore, the right, if
they chose to exercise it, to extend their protection to him” and “that
from international law . . . Austria could derive no authority to
obstruct or interfere with the United States in the exercise of this
right, in effecting the liberation of Koszta.”84 The Secretary of State
thus used international legal principles regarding the defense of citi-
zens to justify the captain’s actions as appropriate self-defense rather
than as aggression that would require congressional authorization.85
80 The facts discussed here are detailed in the CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE
SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE CHARGE D’AFFAIRES OF AUSTRIA RELATIVE TO THE
CASE OF MARTIN KOSZTA (Washington, Robert Armstrong 1853) [hereinafter KOSZTA
CORRESPONDENCE].
81 Letter from Chevalier Hulsemann, Charge D’Affaires of Austria, to William L.
Marcy, Sec’y of State (Aug. 29, 1853), in KOSZTA CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 80, at 3,
6–7.
82 Id.
83 Letter from William L. Marcy, Sec’y of State, to Chevalier Hulsemann, Charge
D’Affaires of Austria (Sept. 26, 1853), in KOSZTA CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 80, at 8,
24–25.
84 Id. at 27.
85 The captain’s actions were highly popular in the United States, and Congress
awarded him a medal. See A Joint Resolution Directing the Presentation of a Medal to
Commander Duncan N. Ingraham, No. 24, 10 Stat. 594 (Aug. 4, 1854).
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Shortly after the Koszta affair, there was a more controversial
episode of overseas military action ostensibly aimed at protecting U.S.
citizens. In 1854, a U.S. warship bombarded and burned the port city
of Greytown, Nicaragua (now San Juan del Norte), following damage
to some American property and an injury to a U.S. official by a bottle
thrown by a mob.86 Especially because the Greytown incident
involved reprisals rather than direct measures of self-defense or
rescue, it prompted constitutional concerns in Congress.87
In justifying his actions to Congress, President Pierce emphasized
their appropriateness under international law. He likened Greytown
to “a piratical resort of outlaws or a camp of savages” rather than to a
nation and argued that the U.S. action was consistent with interna-
tional practice.88 International themes similarly were picked up in a
later judicial decision relating to these events, Durand v. Hollins,
which upheld the constitutionality of the bombardment in a suit
brought against the navy captain by a U.S. citizen whose property had
been destroyed during the operation.89 The court noted the core
“object and duty” of governments to protect their citizens “whether
abroad or at home” and concluded that the President is the appro-
priate actor within the United States to whom “citizens abroad must
look for protection of person and of property.”90 How the President
exercises discretion in protecting citizens, concluded the court, is a
political question not subject to review by the judiciary.91
The use of international law as a formal source of support for the
President’s constitutional powers received doctrinal support from the
Supreme Court in several cases near the close of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Dicta in In re Neagle92 suggested that the President’s constitu-
tional responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
86 For a general discussion of the incident, see Bombardment of Greytown, 7 MOORE
DIGEST, ch. XXIV, § 1168, at 346–54.
87 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 2d Sess. 951 (1855) (statement of Rep. Peckham)
(arguing that the action in Greytown was “contrary to the Constitution,” which was
designed “carefully to avoid conferring upon the Executive, under any circumstances,
without the consent of Congress, power to involve the country in war”); CONG. GLOBE,
33d Cong., 2d Sess. app. 71 (1855) (statement of Rep. Cox) (arguing that the action was
inconsistent with “notions of strict construction of the Constitution”).
88 President Franklin Pierce, Second Annual Message (Dec. 4, 1854), in 5
PRESIDENTIAL COMPILATION, supra note 16, at 273, 282, 284. Pierce’s successor, President
Buchanan, had a narrower view of his war powers, stating that the President “can not
legitimately resort to force without the direct authority of Congress, except in resisting and
repelling hostile attacks.” President James Buchanan, Second Annual Message (Dec. 6,
1858), in 5 PRESIDENTIAL COMPILATION, supra note 16, at 497, 516.
89 8 F. Cas. 111 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186).
90 Id. at 112.
91 Id.
92 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
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executed”93 is not “limited to the enforcement of acts of Congress or
of treaties of the United States according to their express terms,” but
rather includes “the rights, duties and obligations growing out of the
Constitution itself, our international relations, and all the protection
implied by the nature of the government under the Constitution.”94
An example cited by the Court in support of this broader executive
authority was the Koszta affair discussed above,95 which it described,
with some exaggeration, as “[o]ne of the most remarkable episodes in
the history of our foreign relations.”96 In addition, The Paquete
Habana97 emphasized that “[i]nternational law is part of our law,”98 a
proposition that was invoked in support of the claim that the
President’s authority under the Take Care Clause included the
authority to enforce international law, potentially through the use of
military force.99
Around this time, presidents began asserting particularly expan-
sive conceptions of their authority to protect U.S. citizens abroad.
During the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900, President McKinley
sent over 5000 troops to China as part of a multinational force without
first seeking congressional authorization,100 explaining that the U.S.
action “involved no war against the Chinese nation” and was justified
in part by the need to “secur[e] wherever possible the safety of
American life and property in China.”101 His Secretary of War at the
time, Elihu Root, would later cite the Boxer Rebellion as a leading
93 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
94 135 U.S. at 64. Consistent with the Court’s reasoning in that case, Henry Monaghan
has argued that the President’s authority to enforce the laws “includes a general authority
to protect and defend the personnel, property, and instrumentalities of the United States
from harm.” Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 11 (1993).
95 See supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text.
96 135 U.S. at 64.
97 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
98 Id. at 700.
99 E.g., J. REUBEN CLARK, SOLICITOR FOR THE DEP’T OF STATE, RIGHT TO PROTECT
CITIZENS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES BY LANDING FORCES 40 (rev. ed. 1912) (quoting The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700).
100 See Boxer Movement, 5 MOORE DIGEST, ch. IX, §§ 808–10, at 476–533 (describing
the circumstances surrounding President McKinley’s dispatch of troops in response to the
Boxer Rebellion). For accounts of the Boxer Rebellion, see DIANA PRESTON, THE BOXER
REBELLION: THE DRAMATIC STORY OF CHINA’S WAR ON FOREIGNERS THAT SHOOK THE
WORLD IN THE SUMMER OF 1900 (1999), and DAVID J. SIBLEY, THE BOXER REBELLION
AND THE GREAT GAME IN CHINA (2012).
101 President William McKinley, Message to Congress (Dec. 3, 1900), in 34 CONG. REC.
2, 4 (1901). President McKinley may have been more willing to push the boundaries of his
authority to defend citizens abroad not only because the opponents were non-state actors,
but also because the United States was part of a multinational coalition. See id. at 3–4
(noting the multinational nature of the intervention).
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example in support of the proposition that “in times of special distur-
bance it is an international custom for the countries having the power
to intervene directly for the protection of their own citizens.”102
Also during this period, the executive branch, first under
Theodore Roosevelt and then under William Howard Taft, began
undertaking various “international police actions” ostensibly designed
to restore order in Latin American countries during the early twen-
tieth century.103 In an essay published after he left the presidency, Taft
argued that these actions were justified constitutionally because of the
inability of the local governments to protect U.S. citizens under inter-
national law. As he explained, while using force to protect American
citizens was potentially an “act of war [as a matter of constitutional
law] if committed in a country like England or Germany or France,”
this was not the case in countries where “law and order are not main-
tained, as in some Central and South American countries.”104
The executive branch’s formal reliance on international law to
justify the President’s constitutional power to defend citizens is evi-
dent in a 1912 State Department legal memorandum titled Right to
Protect Citizens in Foreign Countries by Landing Forces.105 Much of
the memorandum attempts to explain why engaging in such protection
is proper under international law. But the memorandum also links the
purported legality of the actions under international law to the consti-
tutionality of unilateral presidential action. Military actions designed
to protect American citizens abroad, the memorandum argues, do not
constitute “war” under international law and therefore do not impli-
cate Congress’s authority to declare war.106 The memorandum also
contends that, because international law is part of U.S. law (as
declared in The Paquete Habana), the President’s authority to take
care that the laws are faithfully executed includes the authority to take
military action when such action is allowed by international law.107
For the latter point, the memorandum emphasizes the Supreme
Court’s decision in In re Neagle.108 Attached as an appendix to the
memorandum is a chronological description of instances in which the
102 Elihu Root, The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad, 4 AM. J. INT’L L.
517, 520 (1910).
103 David Gartner, Foreign Relations, Strategic Doctrine, and Presidential Power, 63
ALA. L. REV. 499, 503, 527 (2012); see BOOT, supra note 77, at 129–56 (describing
American military interventions in Latin America between 1898 and 1914).
104 William Howard Taft, The Boundaries Between the Executive, the Legislative and the
Judicial Branches of the Government, 25 YALE L.J. 599, 610–11 (1916).
105 CLARK, supra note 99.
106 Id. at 34–36.
107 Id. at 40–43.
108 Id. at 41–43.
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United States had used military force “for the protection of American
interests.”109 The memorandum proved influential and subsequent
editions were prepared in 1929 and 1934.110
In the years after the publication of this memorandum, the execu-
tive branch relied less on international law as a formal basis for its
constitutional authority. Instead, it relied on past practices without
acknowledging the role that international law had played in justifying
these practices. This phenomenon is evident, for example, in an oft-
cited memorandum that Robert Jackson prepared in 1941 when
serving as Attorney General. In the memorandum, Jackson analyzed
whether the President could, prior to the United States’ entry in
World War II, constitutionally direct the U.S. air force to instruct
British pilots in combat.111 In concluding that he could, Jackson made
a number of general observations about the President’s war powers,
including the observation that “the President’s authority has long
been recognized as extending to the dispatch of armed forces outside
of the United States, either on missions of good will or rescue, or for
the purpose of protecting American lives or property or American
interests.”112 Jackson then cited to the 1934 edition of the 1912 State
Department memorandum, but made no mention of how this memo-
randum relied on international law for its constitutional reasoning.113
With the President’s domestic constitutional authority separated from
its international legal roots, this constitutional authority would more
easily survive seismic shifts in international law—such as would come
with the U.N. Charter.
B. After the U.N. Charter: The United States Comes to Interpret
Article 51 in Ways That Track the President’s
Constitutional Authority
Because the U.N. Charter limited lawful uses of force abroad to
those authorized by the Security Council or in individual or collective
109 Id. at 45. See also Note, Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit Forces to
Combat, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1771, 1776 (1968) (“Since international law as well as statutes
and treaties had long been considered part of the ‘laws’ to which the ‘faithfully executed’
clause refers, any interests evidenced by those laws became a potential subject for
presidential protection by force.” (internal citation omitted)).
110 See J. REUBEN CLARK, SOLICITOR FOR THE DEP’T OF STATE, RIGHT TO PROTECT
CITIZENS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES BY LANDING FORCES (2d rev. ed. 1929); J. REUBEN
CLARK, SOLICITOR FOR THE DEP’T OF STATE, RIGHT TO PROTECT CITIZENS IN FOREIGN
COUNTRIES BY LANDING FORCES (3d rev. ed. 1934) (containing supplemental appendix up
to 1933).
111 Training of British Flying Students in the United States, 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 58 (1941).
112 Id. at 62 (emphasis added).
113 Id.
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self-defense following an armed attack, the Charter could have nar-
rowed the President’s constitutional authority if this authority was
deemed tied to international law. Ultimately, however, this is not how
it turned out. Instead, the executive branch continued to assert the
constitutional authority to protect citizens abroad and, aided by the
interactive dynamic, came to interpret Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
broadly to authorize uses of force to defend citizens abroad.
As with the growth of the President’s domestic war powers, the
United States developed its position that the U.N. Charter authorizes
the defense of citizens abroad through initial practices that later
would be read broadly. The first of these was in 1958, when President
Eisenhower dispatched 14,000 troops to Lebanon. For its international
legal justification, the executive branch relied mainly on the fact that
it had been invited by the pro-Western Lebanese government to
address an internal insurrection that was being exacerbated by influ-
ence from Egypt and Syria and, indirectly, by the Soviets.114 Although
not specifically endorsed in the U.N. Charter, consent by a host gov-
ernment has come to be recognized as an appropriate basis under
international law for intervention “if there has been outside subver-
sion against the government.”115 Eisenhower also observed, however,
that a “mission of these forces is to protect American lives—there are
about 2500 Americans in Lebanon.”116 Notably, Eisenhower had stat-
utory authorization for the action, since Congress had the previous
year enacted a joint resolution stating in relation to the Middle East
that “if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United
States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or
group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression
from any country controlled by international communism.”117 In
terms of the interactive dynamic, Eisenhower thus operated from a
114 See, e.g., RICHARD B. LILLICH, LILLICH ON THE FORCIBLE PROTECTION OF
NATIONALS ABROAD 43–44, 46–47 (Thomas C. Wingfield & James E. Meyen eds., 2002).
115 GRAY, supra note 29, at 81; see also Quincy Wright, Editorial Comment, United
States Intervention in the Lebanon, 53 AM. J. INT’L L. 112, 125 (1959) (concluding that
intervention based on invitation is lawful to assist a government facing insurrection that is
“primarily due to ‘subversive intervention’ from outside,” although doubting this standard
was met with regard to Lebanon).
116 President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Statement by the President Following the Landing
of United States Marines at Beirut (July 15, 1958), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
?pid=11133. For skepticism, in light of this operation, about whether the use of force to
protect nationals abroad is consistent with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, see Wright,
supra note 115. Wright notes that, although “[t]here have been many cases in which states
have landed forces in foreign territory to protect embassies or other government
agencies, . . . or to protect the lives of their citizens[,] [i]t is difficult to bring these
extensions within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter.” Id. at 117.
117 Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East, Pub. L. No. 85-
7, § 2, 71 Stat. 5, 5 (1957).
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position of maximum strength under domestic law at the time that he
invoked consent and hinted at the defense of citizens as justifications
for intervention under international law.
In the mid-1960s, President Johnson dispatched troops to the
Dominican Republic after substantial fighting broke out between the
military-led government and rebel forces. Johnson explained to the
public that he had acted “to give protection to hundreds of Americans
who are still in the Dominican Republic and to escort them safely
back to this country.”118 The United States also sent a letter to the
U.N. Security Council explaining that the operation was designed “to
protect American citizens still there and escort them to safety from
the country.”119 Critics charged, however, that the operation far
exceeded what was needed to protect American lives and that its pur-
pose ultimately was to prevent the establishment of a Communist gov-
ernment in the Dominican Republic.120 Moreover, the United States
did not invoke Article 51; rather, to the extent that it offered any justi-
fication under international law, it emphasized regional security
issues.121 Because of the accretion of practice, presidential action to
protect U.S. citizens abroad was viewed as having a strong domestic
legal footing, and the executive branch appears as a result to have
been more willing to push the boundaries of international law.
The most significant military conflict during Johnson’s adminis-
tration—the Vietnam War (discussed below in Section IV.A)—did
not involve the protection of American citizens. In the wake of that
war, Congress enacted the War Powers Resolution,122 which contains
not only a provision requiring the president to withdraw U.S. troops
from hostilities within sixty days in the absence of congressional
118 President Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement on Sending Troops to the Dominican
Republic (Apr. 28, 1965), http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-4032.
119 Permanent Rep. of the United States to the U.N., Letter dated April 29, 1965 from
the Permanent Rep. of the United States of America addressed to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/6310 (Apr. 29, 1965).
120 See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 23,857 (1965) (statement of Sen. Fulbright); Ved P. Nanda,
The United States’ Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis: Impact on World Order—Part I, 43
DENV. L.J. 439 (1966).
121 See Leonard C. Meeker, The Dominican Situation in the Perspective of International
Law, DEP’T ST. BULL. (U.S. Dep’t of State, Washington, D.C.), July 5, 1965, at 60, 64–65
(urging that “international law [grows] out of the life of nations” and not squarely
defending the legality of the intervention under existing international law). Consulted
confidentially about whether the operation was legal under international law, Abe Fortas
expressed doubts that it was legal and urged that moral rather than legal arguments be
made. Memorandum from Abe Fortas to McGeorge Bundy (May 6, 1965) [hereinafter
Fortas Memorandum] (copy on file with authors; original available in the Lyndon B.
Johnson Library and Museum).
122 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2012).
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authorization,123 but also a provision that could be thought to limit the
President’s authority under domestic law to initiate the use of force in
protection of citizens abroad. Section 2(c) of the Resolution states as a
matter of “purpose and policy” that the President has the constitu-
tional authority to introduce U.S. armed forces into hostilities “only
pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authoriza-
tion, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United
States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.”124 Ironically,
the omission of a presidential power to use force to protect American
citizens had the effect of undermining Section 2(c) rather than of
weakening the legality of this presidential power. As Thomas Franck
put it, “[t]he enumeration [in Section 2(c)] could not be taken to be
binding because it is plainly not exhaustive. Gone is reference to pres-
idential power to rescue citizens endangered abroad.”125 In other
words, the President’s rescue authority had become sufficiently settled
in domestic practice that Congress’s failure to mention it was viewed
as confirmation that Section 2(c) could not be treated as a reliable
statement of constitutional law.
At the same time that the President’s domestic power to use force
in defense of nationals abroad was recognized as too strong to be dis-
lodged, the United States began expressly asserting the existence of a
similar right under the U.N. Charter. For example, in 1975, President
Ford directed military operations to recover the U.S. container ship
Mayaguez after it had been seized by Cambodian forces. In a letter to
the U.N. Security Council, the United States invoked its right of self-
defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.126 The operation was
popular domestically and generated only muted criticism abroad.127
Even more prominently, after U.S. embassy personnel were taken
123 Id. § 1544(b).
124 Id. § 1541(c). Unsurprisingly, “[t]he Executive Branch has taken the position from
the very beginning that § 2(c) of the [War Powers Resolution] does not constitute a legally
binding definition of Presidential authority to deploy our armed forces.” Overview of the
War Powers Resolution, 8 Op. O.L.C. 271, 274 (1984).
125 Thomas M. Franck, After the Fall: The New Procedural Framework for Congressional
Control over the War Power, 71 AM. J. INT’L L. 605, 613 (1977).
126 Permanent Rep. of the United States to the U.N., Letter dated May 14, 1975 from
the Permanent Rep. of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/11689 (May 15, 1975).
127 E.g., Philip Shabecoff, Ford is Backed: Senate Unit Endorses His Right to Order
Military Action, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1975, at A1 (describing how the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee unanimously “support[ed] the President in the exercise of his
constitutional powers within the framework of the War Powers Resolution to secure the
release of the ship and its men”); see also War Powers: A Test of Compliance Relative to the
Danang Sealift, the Evacuation of Phnom Penh, the Evacuation of Saigon, and the
Mayaguez Incident: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Sec. & Sci. Affairs of the H.
Comm. on Int’l Relations, 94th Cong. 2–8 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 Hearings] (including
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hostage in Iran, President Carter authorized a military rescue effort,
which, because of mechanical difficulties, had to be aborted while in
progress. Carter explained to Congress that, “[i]n carrying out this
operation, the United States was acting wholly within its right, in
accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, to protect
and rescue its citizens where the government of the territory in which
they are located is unable or unwilling to protect them.”128 The
United States also sent a letter to the U.N. Security Council
explaining that the operation was initiated pursuant to the United
States’ right of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter “with
the aim of extricating American nationals who have been and remain
the victims of the Iranian armed attack on our Embassy.”129
The administrations of President Reagan and President George
H.W. Bush engaged in a number of military actions ostensibly related
to the protection of American citizens. These included the 1983 inva-
sion of Grenada, air strikes against Libya in 1986, and the 1989 inva-
sion of Panama. The State Department’s Legal Adviser, Abraham
Sofaer, subsequently explained that, although “[s]ome international
lawyers argue that self-defense may be exercised only in response to
an attack upon the territory of the State taking such action,” “[t]he
United States rejects this notion” and “believes it has the right to
defend its nationals from attacks, no matter where such attacks are
launched, especially if they are launched with the specific intent to
harass its nationals.”130 These actions all attracted significant legal and
political controversy internationally, especially because the air strikes
in Libya constituted what were in essence reprisals rather than rescues
and the interventions in Grenada and Panama went far beyond the
defense of citizens to encompass regime change.131 Because of its
institutional design, however, the Security Council did not condemn
testimony by the Legal Adviser of the State Department regarding the President’s
constitutional authority to use force to protect U.S. citizens abroad).
128 President Jimmy Carter, Message to Congress (Apr. 26, 1980), in DEP’T ST. BULL.
(U.S. Dep’t of State, Washington, D.C.), June 1980, at 42, 43. OLC had earlier provided a
legal opinion concluding that the President had domestic legal authority to use force to
rescue the hostages. Presidential Powers Relating to the Situation in Iran, 4A Op. O.L.C.
115, 121 (1979).
129 Permanent Rep. of the United States to the U.N., Letter dated Apr. 25, 1980 from
the Permanent Rep. of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/13908 (Apr. 25, 1980). For a defense of
the international legality of the rescue effort, see Oscar Schachter, International Law in the
Hostage Crisis: Implications for Future Cases, in AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN: THE
CONDUCT OF A CRISIS 325, 334 (Warren Christopher et al. eds., 1985).
130 Abraham D. Sofaer, The Legality of the United States Action in Panama, 29 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 281, 286 (1991).
131 See GRAY, supra note 29, at 157–58, 196 (discussing the General Assembly’s
condemnation of U.S. action).
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these actions—for example, a resolution declaring the Grenada inter-
vention a violation of international law failed after receiving eleven
favorable votes, three abstentions, and one veto (by the United
States).132 Although there were condemnations of the actions in the
U.N. General Assembly,133 the Assembly, unlike the Council, lacks
the authority to issue binding pronouncements.
In essence, although executive branch lawyers did not put it in
these terms, the United States was coming to understand the U.N.
Charter regime governing the use of force in ways that closely resem-
bled the protective power asserted under domestic law by presidents
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Substantively, the
United States was expanding the scope of its claims to situations that
looked like reprisals (as presidents had earlier done in incidents like
Greytown) and encompassed regime change (as with some police
actions in Latin America in the early twentieth century). As in U.S.
domestic law, executive branch lawyers emphasized past U.S. practice
in justifying their choices and read these practices broadly.134 Taken
together, these factors suggest that executive branch lawyers were
transfusing domestic legal principles into the international legal
context.
* * *
Overall, the President’s power to use military force to protect
Americans abroad reveals the interactive dynamic described in Part I.
Presidents have long invoked international law to help justify their
domestic authority. After domestic historical practice had accumu-
lated, it was then cited as its own source of authority, even after inter-
national law became less supportive with the creation of the U.N.
Charter. In turn, presidents eventually came to read Article 51 of the
Charter to authorize broad uses of force for the defense of citizens
abroad, with executive branch lawyers approaching this issue in ways
that paralleled the domestic legal framework. This is not to say that
132 1983 U.N.Y.B. 211, U.N. Sales No. E.86.I.1. Eleven members of Congress brought
suit seeking to enjoin the Grenada operation, but the suit was dismissed on the ground that
the plaintiffs should be required to pursue institutional rather than judicial remedies. See
Conyers v. Reagan, 578 F. Supp. 324, 327 (D.D.C. 1984), dismissed as moot, 765 F.2d 1124,
1125 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
133 See THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE 88, 91, 93 (2002) (describing
General Assembly votes condemning interventions in Grenada, Libya, and Panama).
134 See, e.g., Abraham D. Sofaer, International Law and the Use of Force, NAT’L INT.,
Fall 1988, at 53, 55 (suggesting that past U.S. practices in Lebanon, the Dominican
Republic, and the seizure of the Mayaguez supported a “principled but practical
approach,” which the Reagan Administration was similarly applying regarding Grenada
and Libya).
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U.S. practice has succeeded in changing international law. The claim
of a right to use force to protect nationals abroad has not generated
consensus, especially outside the context of targeted rescue efforts,
and in a number of instances uses of force by the United States under
this rationale have been heavily criticized as being either dispropor-
tionate or pretextual.135 Nevertheless, U.S. practice (along with the
practice of certain other nations) has helped to make it plausible that
international law permits some use of force to protect nationals
abroad.136
III
SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS
The legality of uses of force against non-state actors on the terri-
tory of other states has come into sharp relief in the years since
September 11, 2001. But this issue is not a new one, either in the U.S.
separation of powers or in international law. Similar to other aspects
of the use of force, the story is mostly one of expanding legal authority
for unitary actors at the expense of collective actors, and the connec-
tions between the domestic and the international legal frameworks are
strong.
A. The Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries: Presidents Draw
on International Law in Asserting Constitutional Authority
As with the defense of U.S. citizens, nineteenth-century presi-
dents pointed to international legal principles in claiming that they
had constitutional authority to use force abroad against non-state
actors even without congressional authorization. Indeed, at that time
the defense of citizens and uses of force against non-state actors were
135 See generally DINSTEIN, supra note 25, at 216–19, 255–59 (arguing for proportionality
in assessing uses of force); GRAY, supra note 29, at 126–29 (discussing the relationship
between a state’s right to self-defense and the powers of the Security Council); RUYS,
supra note 63, at 213–49 (assessing international law arguments related to protection of
nationals).
136 E.g., ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
USE OF FORCE: BEYOND THE UN CHARTER PARADIGM 110 (1993) (noting that modern
practice by those states most directly affected by the issue, including practice by the United
States, “would seem to call into question the existence of a rule prohibiting state
intervention to protect nationals”); FRANCK, supra note 133, at 77 (suggesting that the
international response to the practice of the United States and some other nations
“manifest[s] a situational ethic rather than doctrinaire consistency either prohibiting or
permitting all such actions”); Kristen E. Eichensehr, Note, Defending Nationals Abroad:
Assessing the Lawfulness of Forcible Hostage Rescues, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 451, 460 (2008)
(noting that “powerful states, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel,
France, and Belgium have consistently asserted that the defense of nationals remains an
acceptable justification for the use of force, and they have sometimes acted on this belief”).
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closely intertwined, and many of the early precedents discussed in
Part II also involved actions taken against non-state actors. In justi-
fying the constitutional authority to use force, presidents drew on the
formal distinction in international law between state and non-state
actors.
President Monroe’s actions with regard to Spanish-owned Florida
provide early examples. In 1817, he ordered the U.S. military to
Amelia Island to dislodge a band of “freebooters and smugglers of
various nations” who were using it as a base for smuggling slaves into
the United States in violation of its prohibition on the slave trade.137
The following year, he authorized U.S. forces (led by Andrew
Jackson) to enter Florida in pursuit of raiding Seminoles.138 In both
instances, Monroe emphasized that these actions were justified under
international law because Spain was “utterly unable” to control the
offending actors on its territory.139 Monroe also treated it as constitu-
tionally significant that, under international law, the offenders were
private actors rather than states. When Jackson went beyond his
instructions and captured Spanish forts, Monroe chastised him on the
ground that, while pursuit of the Seminoles was the United States’
“right by the law of nations,” an attack on the Spanish posts “would
authorize war, to which, by the principles of our Constitution, the
Executive is incompetent.”140
As the nineteenth century progressed, presidents increasingly felt
themselves entitled to pursue non-state actors without congressional
authorization, particularly where these actors were pirates or could be
137 15 ANNALS OF CONG. 1786 (1818).
138 See DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICA 1815–1848, at 98–104 (2007) (detailing Jackson’s campaign in Florida).
139 President James Monroe, Special Message to Congress (Jan. 13, 1818), in 2
PRESIDENTIAL COMPILATION, supra note 16, at 23, 24; see also President James Monroe,
Special Message to Congress (Mar. 25, 1818), in 2 PRESIDENTIAL COMPILATION, supra note
16, at 31, 31 (noting Spain’s “utter inability” to control the situation on the ground).
140 Letter from President James Monroe to General Andrew Jackson (July 19, 1818), in
6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MONROE 54, 55–56 (Stanislaus Murray Hamilton ed., 1902); see
also President James Monroe, Second Annual Message, in 2 PRESIDENTIAL COMPILATION,
supra note 16, at 39, 43 (stating with regard to U.S. relations with Spain that the “power of
the Executive is deemed incompetent [to change them]; it is vested in Congress only”). For
an account of the constitutional debate in Congress triggered by Jackson’s actions, see
David P. Currie, Rumors of Wars: Presidential and Congressional War Powers, 1809–1829,
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 13–16 (2000). Later in the nineteenth century, the contours of the
right to pursue a non-state actor onto the territory of a more able state would be taken up
by Daniel Webster and Lord Ashburton in their famous exchange of notes over the
Caroline incident, in which British forces crossed into the United States in hot pursuit of
Americans who had been running arms to Canadian rebels. See R.Y. Jennings, The
Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 82, 92 (1938) (discussing the Caroline
case).
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analogized to pirates. Indeed, members of Congress also seemed to
believe that the special status of pirates under international law sup-
ported presidential power in this regard. When President Monroe
encouraged congressional legislation authorizing hot pursuit of pirates
onto the territory of foreign sovereigns in the Caribbean,141 the House
Committee on Foreign Relations rejected such legislation as unneces-
sary. It concluded that because pirates are “the common enemies of
mankind” under international law, they could not “avail [themselves]
of the protection of the territory of the third power . . . . Under this
rule, the pursuit and capture of pirates anywhere, and everywhere,
may be justified. The Executive has acted upon it.”142 Given these
signs of acquiescence, later presidents would accordingly find it
helpful to justify uses of force abroad by making analogies to piracy,
including uses of forces for the asserted defense of citizens. For
example, as discussed in Part II, President Jackson drew such an
analogy to justify the use of force in Sumatra, and President Pierce did
so to justify the bombardment of Greytown.143
Uses of force by the United States in the early twentieth century
also often involved the defense of citizens against non-state actors,
including in the Boxer Rebellion and some operations in Latin
America.144 One particularly famous incident occurred when
President Wilson ordered U.S. forces into Mexico in 1916 to kill or
capture revolutionary Pancho Villa following his U.S. raids. Because
Wilson initially obtained the consent of Mexico (although this was
141 See President James Monroe, Eighth Annual Message (Dec. 7, 1824), in 2
PRESIDENTIAL COMPILATION, supra note 16, at 248, 258 (submitting to Congress for
consideration whether pirates should be pursued in foreign territories).
142 H.R. COMM. OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 19TH CONG., REPORT ON PIRACY AND
OUTRAGES ON AMERICAN COMMERCE BY SPANISH PRIVATEERS (Jan. 31, 1825), reprinted
in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: NAVAL AFFAIRS 187, 187–88 (Asbury Dickins & John W.
Forney eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1860) (noting, however, that unless Spain
“wanted either the power or the will to do her duty,” it would be inappropriate to conduct
searches outside the context of pursuit). As the report discussed, prior legislation already
authorized the executive branch to defend U.S. merchant ships against pirates at sea,
although the House Committee expressed its view that this authorization implicated “a
power, however, which the President possesses [even] without an act of Congress.” Id. at
187.
143 See supra text accompanying notes 78, 88; see also John Bassett Moore, Remarks at
the Meeting of the American Philosophical Society (Apr. 23, 1921), in 60 PROC. AM. PHIL.
SOC., at xviii (1921) (arguing that the Greytown incident should not serve as precedent for
an expansion of presidential war power, because “Greytown was a community claiming to
exist outside the bounds of any recognized state or political entity, and the legality of the
action taken against it was defended by President Pierce and Secretary Marcy on that
express ground”). For an argument that an independent presidential power to attack non-
state actors on the territory of other states existed as an originalist manner, at least where
the other state was not opposed to the attack, see Ramsey, supra note 13, at 1632.
144 See supra notes 100–04 and accompanying text.
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later revoked), he was on strong grounds under international law
when the raid began, and he did not pursue congressional approval for
his actions.145 With these precedents and the prior ones, presidents
came to conclude that they had constitutional authority to use force
for self-defense (broadly defined) against non-state actors operating
on the territory of other states, at least where these other states either
permitted the intervention or were not capable of curbing the
offenders.
B. After the U.N. Charter: The United States Interprets International
Law Broadly at Times of Strong Domestic Legal Authority
The restrictions on the use of force in the U.N. Charter poten-
tially limited the legality of uses of force against non-state actors oper-
ating on the territory of other states as a matter of international law.
Although the issue was not entirely settled, substantial formal legal
authority prior to 2001 suggested that non-state actors acting indepen-
dently from states could not commit an “armed attack” for purposes
of Article 51—and thus that states who were harmed by these non-
state actors could not invoke Article 51 as a basis for responding with
military force.146 Under this view, a state could only use force in self-
defense against a non-state actor on the territory of another state if
145 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES 486–88 (1925). Wilson’s actions had strong support in Congress; the
Senate unanimously passed a resolution approving of the pursuit of Pancho Villa and
emphasizing “that such military expedition shall not be permitted to encroach in any
degree upon the sovereignty of Mexico.” 53 CONG. REC. 4274 (1916).
146 For detailed treatment, see RUYS, supra note 63, at 368–433. See also GRAY, supra
note 29, at 199 (observing that “[f]or many states and commentators the concept of self-
defense against non-state actors was unacceptable before 9/11”). As Ruys notes, supra
note 63, at 370, in recommending that the Senate give its advice and consent to the NATO
treaty, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations had observed that the words “armed
attack” in the Charter and the NATO treaty “clearly do not mean an incident created by
irresponsible groups or individuals, but rather an attack by one State upon another.” 95
CONG. REC. 9820 (1949). The I.C.J. signaled its support for this understanding in Nicaragua
v. United States. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, 103–05, ¶ 195 (June 27). In recent years, the I.C.J.
has also appeared to embrace this position. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of
a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, 194,
¶ 139 (July 9) (noting that “Israel does not claim that the attacks against it are imputable to
a foreign state” and concluding that “Article 51 of the Charter has no relevance in this
case”); see also Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, 222–23, ¶ 146 (Dec. 19) (rejecting Uganda’s
claim of self-defense because the attacks against it were not attributable to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo). But see Kimberley N. Trapp, Can Non-State Actors Mount an
Armed Attack?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 679, 685–89 (Marc Weller ed., 2015) (arguing that these decisions should be more
narrowly construed).
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this other state was colluding in some way with the non-state actor. As
we discuss in this section, however, the United States came to
embrace a broader meaning of “armed attack” in ways that arguably
triggered a shift in international custom. Consistent with the interac-
tive dynamic that we recounted in Part I, the executive branch devel-
oped this broader international legal interpretation in uses of force
that were supported by strong domestic legal authority.
Starting in the 1980s, the United States began to claim a right to
act in self-defense against terrorists on foreign soil at least “when no
other means is available.”147 This claim was acted upon in the strikes
ordered by President Clinton in 1998 against Al Qaeda in Sudan and
Afghanistan following the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania. In its letter to the Security Council invoking Article 51
in support of the strikes, the United States noted that it was acting
“only after repeated efforts to convince the Government of the Sudan
and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to shut these terrorist activities
down and to cease their cooperation with the Bin Ladin organiza-
tion.”148 The reaction to the U.S. actions by other states was “mixed
and muted.”149 In both instances, there was little if any doubt about
the President’s constitutional authority to undertake these missions in
light of the assaults on the U.S. embassies.
The question of self-defense against non-state actors on foreign
soil sprang to the forefront after the terrorist attack of September 11.
On September 12, 2001, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution
1368 condemning the attack, “[r]ecognizing the inherent right of indi-
vidual or collective self-defense in accordance with the Charter,”150
and signaling the Council’s “readiness to take all necessary steps.”151
Two days later, the House and the Senate approved the 2001 AUMF,
which authorized the President to “use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
147 George P. Shultz, Low-Intensity Warfare: The Challenge of Ambiguity, DEP’T ST.
BULL. (U.S. Dep’t of State, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 1986, at 15, 17. In articulating this
position, Secretary of State Shultz emphasized that “[t]he UN Charter is not a suicide
pact,” presumably a deliberate borrowing of the famous parallel phrase with respect to the
Constitution. See id.
148 Permanent Rep. of the United States to the U.N., Letter dated Aug. 20, 1998 from
the Permanent Rep. of the United States of America addressed to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1998/780 (Aug. 20, 1998).
149 RUYS, supra note 63, at 427.
150 S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 31, at 1.
151 Id. ¶ 5.
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persons.”152 With the 2001 AUMF, President Bush was on very strong
ground as a matter of U.S. domestic law in acting against Al Qaeda
and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
With regard to international law, the Bush Administration faced
a choice of either seeking a Security Council resolution explicitly
authorizing the use of force against Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime
or instead simply invoking Article 51. In the end, the Administration
chose to invoke Article 51.153 It is difficult to tell how much the deci-
sion to act without a Security Council resolution was related to the
interactive dynamic, but it is at least plausible that the decision
stemmed in part from the fact that the Administration had extraordi-
narily secure footing in domestic law. Whatever the reason, the
Administration initiated military operations in Afghanistan against Al
Qaeda and the Taliban solely under Article 51. In doing so, it did not
specify the precise connection between the Taliban and Al Qaeda, but
it did make clear that the Taliban was unwilling to crack down on Al
Qaeda and also described Al Qaeda as “supported by the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan.”154
States were generally supportive of the U.S. action.155 Accord-
ingly, numerous commentators think that this action moved the goal-
posts of custom on the use of Article 51 against non-state actors
operating on the territory of a third state.156 The degree of this shift is
of course debated. The United States has come to frame its perceived
152 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, §2, 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001) (signed by President Bush on Sept. 18).
153 See Permanent Rep. of the United States to the U.N., Letter dated Oct. 7, 2001 from
the Permanent Rep. of the United States of America addressed to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/946 (Oct. 7, 2001) [hereinafter Oct. 7 Letter]; see also
Elaine Sciolino & Steven Lee Myers, Bush Says ‘Time is Running Out’; U.S. Plans to Act
Largely Alone, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2001, at A1 (noting that the Bush Administration had
rejected the U.N. Secretary-General’s call for Security Council authorization and that at
first the Pentagon had even been “unwilling to have NATO invoke the alliance’s mutual
defense clause”).
154 Oct. 7 Letter, supra note 153; see also KIMBERLEY N. TRAPP, STATE RESPONSIBILITY
FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 47, 51–61 (2011) (analyzing the extent to which the
Taliban could be considered responsible under the law of state responsibility for the
September 11 attacks).
155 See, e.g., GRAY, supra note 29, at 198 (noting the “almost universal support of states
for a US right of self-defense in response to 9/11”).
156 For a discussion of the various positions, see RUYS, supra note 63, at 439–43. See also
Hakimi, supra note 63, at 7–8, 19–20. The United States is not the only country in recent
times to use force against non-state actors operating on the territory of third states where
these third states are not shown to be responsible under the law of state responsibility.
Israel did so, for example, against Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006. See id. at 9; see also id. at
11–14 (discussing other possible examples). Nonetheless, as the sources cited here indicate,
the response to September 11 is taken as the most important indication of a possible shift
in custom.
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legal right as one to invoke self-defense against non-state actors on
the territory of the other state where that state is “unable or
unwilling” to suppress these non-state actors.157 (This standard is sim-
ilar to one set forth in the House Report on piracy from 1825 men-
tioned earlier and to U.S. justifications for uses of force to defend U.S.
citizens in Latin America in the early twentieth century.158)
Having gained broader acceptance for its position after
September 11, at a time when its authority under domestic law was at
a maximum, the executive branch is now using the “unwilling or
unable” standard in situations that have considerably less secure
domestic legal footing. A currently ongoing example is the U.S. cam-
paign in Syria against ISIL, which started in 2014. In justifying these
hostilities, the executive branch has been on fairly weak authority
under domestic law. It has relied on some indeterminate combination
of the President’s constitutional authority and expansive readings of
the 2001 AUMF and of the 2002 AUMF which authorized the original
intervention against Saddam Hussein’s regime—sources of authority
that are each in some way problematic.159 Under international law,
the United States relied on the “unwilling or unable” standard in con-
junction with the collective self-defense of Iraq, as well as asserted
individual self-defense.160 This claim is stronger under international
157 Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Address at Northwestern University School of Law
(Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-
northwestern-university-school-law. Shortly before the military operation in Pakistan in
2011 that resulted in the killing of Osama bin Laden, lawyers within the executive branch
apparently invoked the “unable or unwilling” concept in concluding that such an operation
would be lawful. See Charlie Savage, How 4 Federal Lawyers Paved the Way to Kill Osama
bin Laden, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2015, at A1.
158 See supra note 142 and accompanying text; see also supra Section II.A. For an
analysis rooting the “unwilling or unable” standard in the law of neutrality, see Ashley S.
Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-
Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483, 499–503 (2012). For a concern that the “unwilling or
unable” standard for the use of force invoked by the United States may be abused by other
states, see Ryan Goodman, State Practice and the Use of Force: Iran Invokes the “Unwilling
or Unable” Test Against Its Neighbors, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 26, 2014, 1:03 PM), https://
www.justsecurity.org/7588/state-practice-force-iran-invokes-unwilling-unable-test-
neighbors/.
159 See Press Release, The White House, Letter from President Obama to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate (Sept. 23,
2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/letter-president-war-powers-
resolution-regarding-iraq (asserting both constitutional and statutory authority for military
action). If President Obama was acting solely under his constitutional authority as
Commander in Chief, then his actions would not be consistent with the War Powers
Resolution’s requirement that the President withdraw from hostilities within sixty days if
there is no specific statutory authorization. For the difficulties inherent in applying the two
AUMFs, see supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
160 See Permanent Rep. of the United States to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 23, 2014
from the Permanent Rep. of the United States of America to the United Nations
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law than it would have been prior to September 11, because of the
increased acceptance of this approach in the community of nations.161
In other words, once the United States had acquired increased state
acquiescence for this standard after September 11 where it had strong
domestic legal grounding, it began to use this standard in a situation in
which the President’s domestic legal grounding was much weaker.
This is yet another example of how presidential decisionmaking on the
use of force may have interactive effects. Indeed, the Obama
Administration believed it important to put in the preamble of its pro-
posed congressional authorization for the use of military force against
ISIL a statement that “the United States has taken military action
against ISIL in accordance with its inherent right of individual and
collective self-defense.”162 In addition to the campaign against ISIL,
the Obama Administration is also signaling its intent to use the
“unwilling or unable” standard in cyber-conflicts in the future.163
As the executive branch is further embracing its “unwilling or
unable” standard for international law, it is simultaneously using this
understanding to inform its constitutional and statutory interpretation
with regard to the targeted killing of U.S. citizens. For example, a
Department of Justice White Paper that became public in 2013 evalu-
ated the circumstances under which the executive branch could law-
fully target a U.S. citizen who was a high-level operational leader of
addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2014/695 (Sept. 23, 2014); see also
Stephen W. Preston, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def., The Legal Framework for the United
States’ Use of Military Force Since 9/11 (Apr. 10, 2015) (transcript available at http://
www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606662/the-legal-framework-for-
the-united-states-use-of-military-force-since-911) (offering a somewhat expanded analysis).
The need to rely on the 2001 AUMF as a matter of domestic law because of the sixty-day
clock of the War Powers Resolution may help explain why the United States is invoking
individual self-defense against ISIL under international law, instead of only invoking the
(stronger) ground of the collective self-defense of Iraq.
161 See Hakimi, supra note 63, at 19–20. In addition, in November 2015, following ISIL’s
terrorist attacks in Paris and elsewhere, the Security Council signaled acquiescence to the
legality of at least certain uses of force against ISIL. Resolution 2249 “[c]alls upon Member
States that have the capacity to do so to take all necessary measures, in compliance with
international law, in particular with the United Nations Charter . . . on the territory under
control of ISIL . . . , to redouble and coordinate their efforts to prevent and suppress
terrorist acts committed specifically by ISIL.” S.C. Res. 2249, ¶ 5 (Nov. 20, 2015).
162 Draft Joint Resolution to Authorize the Limited Use of the United States Armed
Forces Against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant [hereinafter Draft Joint
Resolution], http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/aumf_02112015.pdf
(reproducing draft as proposed by the President on Feb. 11, 2015).
163 Applicability of International Law to Conflicts in Cyberspace, 2014 Digest of United
States Practice in International Law, ch. 18, § A(3)(b) at 735 (quoting the United States
Submission to the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security) (arguing
that “[a] State may act without consent . . . if the territorial State is unwilling or unable to
stop or prevent the actual or imminent armed attack launched in or through cyberspace”).
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Al Qaeda or associated forces.164 In describing how such targeting
would be consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Constitution,
certain statutory provisions, and an executive order prohibiting assas-
sinations, the White Paper emphasized that this targeting would be
consistent with international law. As part of this analysis, the White
Paper twice invoked the “unwilling or unable” standard in claiming
that targeting “would be consistent with international legal principles
of sovereignty and neutrality.”165 Once again, international and
domestic legal argumentation are intertwined.
* * *
In sum, there is considerable interplay between international and
domestic law regarding uses of force against non-state actors. Starting
in the nineteenth century, presidents drew upon international legal
concepts in asserting a domestic constitutional right to use force
against non-state actors under certain conditions despite the absence
of congressional authorization. Although international law changed
with the U.N. Charter, presidents did not revisit the scope of their
domestic constitutional authority. After September 11, and with clear
congressional authorization, President Bush chose to interpret Article
51 of the U.N. Charter expansively to justify the U.S. intervention in
Afghanistan rather than seeking Security Council authorization. This
action led international practice to become more favorable to such
expansive readings of Article 51. Presidents have then in turn invoked
these expansive readings in situations in which Congress has not
clearly authorized the use of force, such as the current campaign
against ISIL. The interplay between international and domestic law
has thus helped presidents to expand their legal authority through
practice in relation to both Congress and the Security Council.
IV
COLLECTIVE AND TREATY-BASED SECURITY
Separate from or in addition to individual self-defense, U.S. uses
of force abroad often occur under the auspices of Security Council
resolutions, as part of multinational coalitions, or in collective self-
164 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST
A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN
ASSOCIATED FORCE (n.d.) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER], http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/
msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf.
165 WHITE PAPER, supra note 164, at 1–2, 5; cf. Rebecca Ingber, International Law
Constraints as Domestic Power, 57 HARV. INT’L L.J. 49, 68–69 (2016) (discussing other
ways in which this White Paper and a related OLC memorandum rely on international law
in reaching their conclusions with regard to domestic law).
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defense of another state. Both before and after the enactment of the
War Powers Resolution, the presence and form of collectivity has
proved relevant for presidents in deciding whether to seek congres-
sional authorization for uses of force. The connections between the
international and the domestic contexts have in turn had important
implications for U.S. constitutional practice and to some extent for
international legal practice as well.
A. Before the War Powers Resolution: Presidents Invoke Treaties in
Claiming Expansive Constitutional Authority
Long before the establishment of the U.N. Charter, presidents
weighed whether their constitutional authority to use force abroad
was enhanced when they were acting to enforce a treaty right. This
question had some nineteenth-century salience, but became even
more important in the early twentieth century, when the United States
entered into treaties with several Latin American countries that
granted the United States the right to use military force either to
defend those countries from external threat or to preserve their
domestic tranquility. In 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt relied on
his Take Care Clause authority with regard to one such treaty—a 1903
treaty with Cuba166—as a justification for authorizing military inter-
vention without congressional approval. With striking candor,
Roosevelt explained his position to William Howard Taft:
[I]f the necessity arises I intend to intervene, and I should not
dream of asking the permission of Congress. That treaty is the law
of the land and I shall execute it. . . . I intend to establish a prece-
dent for good by refusing to wait for a long wrangle in Congress.167
As this letter suggests, Roosevelt not only formally relied on the
treaty as a source of constitutional empowerment, but also understood
that this would help expand presidential power vis-à-vis Congress in
the long run.168
The end of both World War I and World War II saw debates
about U.S. participation in international security regimes. When the
166 Treaty Embodying the Provisions Defining the Future Relations of the United States
with Cuba Contained in the Act of Congress, Approved March 2, 1901, Making
Appropriations, U.S.-Cuba, May 22, 1903, 33 Stat. 2248.
167 Letter from President Theodore Roosevelt to William Howard Taft (Sept. 17, 1906),
in 5 THE LETTERS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 414, 414–15 (Elting E. Morison et al. eds.,
1952). For discussion of various U.S. interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean
during this period, see BOOT, supra note 77, at 129–81.
168 See also Gartner, supra note 103, at 501 (noting that “Roosevelt self-consciously
sought to create precedents for expanded presidential power and both the expanded use of
executive agreements and the deployment of armed forces without congressional approval
continued after his time in office”).
734 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:689
Senate was considering the Treaty of Versailles, a majority of senators
made clear that they did not want any international obligation or
authorization stemming from the League of Nations to substitute for
specific congressional authorizations for the use of force.169 At the
end of World War II, however, the Senate debates over the U.N.
Charter signaled a greater willingness to accept some role for an inter-
national organization in authorizing the use of force as a matter of
domestic law. The presumption at that time was that the United States
would reach an agreement with the United Nations by which it would
place certain troops at the disposal of the Security Council.170 Once
this agreement was reached and approved by Congress, it was
accepted that the President would not need case-specific congres-
sional authorization for uses of force by these troops. A report by the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee justified this anticipated delega-
tion on the grounds that “[p]reventive or enforcement action by these
forces upon the order of the Security Council would not be an act of
war but would be international action for the preservation of the
peace . . . . Consequently, the provisions of the Charter do not affect
the exclusive power of Congress to declare war.”171
In part because of Cold War tensions, the contemplated agree-
ment with the United Nations was never concluded.172 The relation-
ship between congressional war powers and the Security Council
nevertheless soon became an issue after North Korean forces crossed
the Thirty-Eighth Parallel in late June 1950. In response to this devel-
opment, the Security Council (with the Soviet Union boycotting and
thus unavailable to cast a veto173) issued a resolution that recom-
mended that UN members “furnish such assistance to the Republic of
Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore
international peace and security in the area.”174 President Truman
169 Although the Treaty of Versailles never received the advice and consent of the
Senate, during the debates a majority of the Senate voted in favor of a reservation to the
treaty that disclaimed any obligation to use U.S. armed forces “unless in any particular
case the Congress which under the Constitution has the sole power to declare war or
authorize the employment of the military or naval forces of the United States shall in the
exercise of full liberty of action by act or joint resolution so provide.” 59 CONG. REC. 4333
(1920) (recording a vote of 56 to 26).
170 See, e.g., Golove, supra note 68, at 1499–501 (discussing how this assumption, which
stemmed from Article 43 of the U.N. Charter, would affect the allocation of war powers
between the President and Congress); see also United Nations Participation Act of 1945
§ 6, 22 U.S.C. § 287d (2012) (embedding this assumption in the implementing legislation).
171 S. EXEC. REP. NO. 79-8, at 9 (1945).
172 See Golove, supra note 68, at 1520 (noting that negotiations for Article 43
agreements failed “due to the outbreak of the Cold War”).
173 See DEAN ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION: MY YEARS IN THE STATE
DEPARTMENT 404–05 (1969).
174 S.C. Res. 83, U.N. Doc. S/INF/4/Rev.1, at 5 (June 27, 1950).
October 2016] PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS 735
directed that U.S. forces be sent to Korea, an action that would even-
tually lead to the presence of over 300,000 U.S. troops in Korea and
tens of thousands of American casualties.175 Although Truman briefed
congressional leaders and initially had strong support in Congress,176
he did not seek congressional authorization.177 There is some indica-
tion that, as with Theodore Roosevelt, Truman’s choice reflected a
desire to set a precedent favorable to presidential war powers.178
Consistent with the interactive dynamic, the Security Council res-
olution was important to the executive branch’s defense of President
Truman’s constitutional authority—both as a formal matter of doc-
trine and because it was politically salient to Truman’s domestic audi-
ence.179 The State Department provided a legal opinion on President
Truman’s authority that defended his actions on several grounds,
thereby leaving more paths of legal reasoning for successors to use in
the future.180 First, the memorandum emphasized the President’s past
uses of force in defense of American citizens (and, it claimed, some-
times more generally in defense of “the broad interests of American
foreign policy”), but it did not discuss the connections between these
past practices and international law or consider the comparatively
much greater scale of the Korea venture.181 Second, the memorandum
argued that it was appropriate to use force to support the Security
Council’s resolutions because the “continued existence of the United
Nations as an effective international organization is a paramount
United States interest.”182 It also suggested that the U.N. Charter trig-
gered the President’s obligations and authority under the Take Care
175 TORREON, supra note 2, at 10.
176 See ACHESON, supra note 173, at 408 (noting that the President directed a
consultation with congressional leaders); Louis Henkin, Congress, the President and the
United Nations, 3 PACE Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 6 (1991) (“In modest debate, Congress supported
the President’s action, but apparently saw no need to provide a declaration of war or other
formal authorization.”).
177 See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 382
n.37 (2d ed. 1996) (noting, however, that Congress did pass statutes that supported the war
effort by making appropriations and expanding the draft).
178 See ACHESON, supra note 173, at 415 (recalling that Truman did not want to
“establish a precedent in derogation of presidential power to send our forces into battle”).
179 See Galbraith, supra note 57, at 1025–26 (describing the importance of the Security
Council resolution to members of Congress).
180 Authority of the President to Repel the Attack in Korea, DEP’T ST. BULL. (U.S. Dep’t
of State, Washington, D.C.), July 31, 1950, at 173 [hereinafter Authority to Repel].
181 Id. at 173–78. Notably, the memorandum omits discussion of how the protection of
American citizens abroad by the President had been justified constitutionally by way of
reference to international law, see supra Part II, and therefore does not consider whether
the fundamental change in international law brought about by the U.N. Charter would
alter the constitutional landscape on this issue.
182 Authority to Repel, supra note 180, at 177.
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Clause.183 By stripping historical practice of its context and empha-
sizing the Security Council’s resolution, the memorandum provided a
justification for a significant expansion of the President’s constitu-
tional authority to use force without congressional authorization.
For the rest of the Cold War, the Security Council never again
authorized a use of force within a state,184 leaving the only lawful uses
of force on the territory of a non-consenting state to be those taken in
“individual or collective self-defense” pursuant to Article 51. The
Senate encouraged the President to enter into collective defense
regimes185 and then gave its advice and consent to a number of such
treaties, including the treaties establishing NATO and SEATO. As a
matter of international law, these treaties were clearly tied to Article
51.186 As a matter of constitutional law, however, neither the North
Atlantic Treaty creating NATO nor the Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty creating SEATO were intended to substitute for a
congressional authorization to use force. The treaties provided that
their members were to use force in accordance with their “constitu-
tional processes.”187 While different U.S. actors had different views of
the existing state of U.S. constitutional law on the use of force, they
agreed that the treaties were not to change the baseline, whatever it
was. The unanimous understanding set forth in the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee’s report recommending advice and consent to
the North Atlantic Treaty, for example, was that “[n]othing in the
treaty . . . increases or decreases the constitutional powers of either
the President or the Congress or changes the relationship between
them.”188
With the Vietnam War, however, the executive branch came to
blur the line between treaty commitments and constitutional powers.
183 Id. at 176 (quoting Senator Austin).
184 GRAY, supra note 29, at 258.
185 In the 1948 Vandenberg Resolution, the Senate encouraged the President to
“particularly pursue” various objectives “within the United Nations Charter,” including
the “[p]rogressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for
individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles, and
provisions of the Charter.” S. Res. 239, 80th Cong. (1948).
186 See Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty art. IV(1), Sept. 8, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 81,
209 U.N.T.S. 23 (identifying actions that would be taken in response to an “armed attack in
the treaty area against any of the Parties”); North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63
Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 (explicitly referencing Article 51).
187 Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, supra note 186, arts. 4(1) & 9(2) (noting
that, in case of an armed attack on a party to the treaty, each party will “act to meet the
common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes”); North Atlantic Treaty,
supra note 186, art. 11.
188 S. EXEC. REP. NO. 81-8, at 14 (1949); see also id. at 19 (emphatically repeating this
point); cf. S. EXEC. REP. NO. 84-1, at 12 (1955) (recalling this point with regard to the
SEATO treaty).
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The SEATO treaty was invoked not just in asserting that the United
States was acting in the collective self-defense of Vietnam for pur-
poses of international law,189 but also in justifying the constitutionality
of presidential actions. The State Department reasoned that “the
SEATO treaty establishes as a matter of law that a Communist armed
attack against South Viet-Nam endangers the peace and safety of the
United States,” and therefore triggered the President’s powers of con-
stitutional self-defense.190 With this move, the executive branch trans-
formed a commitment intended for an international legal purpose into
a source of constitutional power.
B. After the War Powers Resolution: The Interplay Between
International and Domestic Law
Manifests Itself in Multiple Ways
Following the Vietnam War, Congress tried to restrict the execu-
tive branch’s ability to use treaties as sources of constitutional empow-
erment. In addition to the sixty-day clock and other provisions already
mentioned, the War Powers Resolution provided that the President
should not use “any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified” as grounds
for inferring a constitutional authority to use force.191 As we discuss
below, however, the interactive dynamic between domestic law and
treaties has survived the War Powers Resolution, although it is some-
times manifested in counterintuitive ways. This dynamic appears both
with regard to the initiation of hostilities and to their continuation.
1. Initial Uses of Force
After Congress passed the War Powers Resolution, the executive
branch briefly backed away from the broad claim that the President
had constitutional authority to use force to defend American interests
189 Leonard C. Meeker, The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of
Viet-nam, DEP’T ST. BULL. (U.S. Dep’t of State, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 28, 1966, at 474,
474–82 (1966).
190 Id. at 485. In addition, the executive branch emphasized the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution and the President’s commander-in-chief power. See id. at 484–88. For the latter,
the legal opinion relied heavily on Truman’s initiation of the Korean War, while
downplaying the political and legal importance of the Security Council Resolution to
Truman’s decision to act without congressional authorization. See id. at 484–85, 488; see
also Memorandum from Nicholas Katzenbach, U.S. Attorney Gen., to President Lyndon
B. Johnson (June 10, 1965), in 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968,
at 751, 752 (Glenn W. LaFantasie et al. eds., 1996) (rejecting an argument that the
commander-in-chief power only extends to “minor police measures” on the ground that
“the action taken by President Truman in Korea, which is not widely regarded as having
been illegal, shows how extensive the powers of the President may be”).
191 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a)(2) (2012) (excepting treaties where Congress passes
implementing legislation that serves as a specific congressional authorization).
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abroad.192 Yet it still continued to emphasize treaty commitments. In
1975, for example, the Legal Adviser informed a congressional com-
mittee that the President could introduce troops into hostilities not
only in “the three situations listed in subsection 2(c) of the War
Powers Resolution,” but also “to rescue American citizens abroad, to
rescue foreign nationals where such action directly facilitates the
rescue of U.S. citizens abroad, to protect U.S. Embassies and
Legations abroad, . . . and to carry out the terms of security commit-
ments contained in treaties.”193
In the years since, the executive branch has returned to the
broader formulation of protecting American interests. This move is
evident in the Presidency of George H.W. Bush. In the first Gulf War,
President Bush obtained both a Security Council resolution and con-
gressional authorization—the first (and, as of now, the only) time
when both collective actors have clearly authorized a use of force.194
Not long after, however, President Bush decided to send troops to
Somalia without clear congressional approval, following a Security
Council resolution authorizing nations to “use all necessary means to
establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian
relief operations” there.195 In its memorandum defending the consti-
tutionality of this action, OLC noted both the interest in protecting
American citizens and in supporting U.N. Security Council resolu-
192 See supra notes 112, 181, 190 and accompanying text for discussion of how this claim
had developed earlier.
193 1975 Hearings, supra note 127, at 90–91 (including two other specific contexts and
qualifying this enumeration with the claim that no “single definitional statement can
clearly encompass every conceivable situation in which the President’s Commander in
Chief authority could be exercised”); see also Overview of the War Powers Resolution, 8
Op. O.L.C. 271, 274–75 (1984) (reiterating this list).
194 Although the collective self-defense of Kuwait would probably have sufficed as an
international legal justification, President George H.W. Bush “lobbied hard for the
endorsement of the U.N. Security Council,” which he received in Resolution 678. ELY,
supra note 14, at 50. By contrast, as John Hart Ely wryly observed, Bush “treat[ed the
endorsement] of Congress as optional.” Id.; see also President George H.W. Bush,
Remarks at the Texas State Republican Convention in Dallas, Texas (June 20, 1992), in 1
PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: GEORGE BUSH 1992–93, at
993, 995 (1993) (declaring “I didn’t have to get permission from some old goat in the
United States Congress to kick Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait”). Yet Bush did eventually
seek and obtain congressional authorization. Authorization for Use of Military Force
Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No. 102-1, § 2(a), 105 Stat. 3, 3 (1991) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2012)); see also David J. Scheffer, Use of Force After the
Cold War: Panama, Iraq, and the New World Order, in RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 109, 152 (2d ed. 1991) (“History will view Bush’s grudging
request for congressional authorization as more significant than his attempt . . . to disclaim
any constitutional responsibility to bow to the will of Congress.”).
195 See S.C. Res. 794, ¶ 10 (Dec. 3, 1992).
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tions, citing throughout to past practices.196 “Against the background
of this repeated past practice under many Presidents,” reasoned OLC,
“this Department and this Office have concluded that the President
has the power to commit United States troops abroad for the purpose
of protecting important national interests.”197
From the perspective of the interactive dynamic, this broad claim
of constitutional authority occurred at a time when the President had
a Security Council resolution and was therefore at the apex of interna-
tional legality. In subsequent years, the executive branch has similarly
appeared most comfortable with broad invocations of American inter-
ests as a matter of constitutional law where the enforcement of
Security Council resolutions are at issue—or at the very least where
the United States is acting as a part of NATO. This is the case for the
following U.S. interventions: Haiti in 1994, which was authorized by
the Security Council;198 Bosnia in 1995, which was authorized by the
Security Council and carried out through NATO;199 Kosovo in 1999,
which was carried out through NATO;200 Haiti in 2004, which was
authorized by the Security Council;201 and most recently Libya in
196 Auth. to U.S. Military Forces in Somalia, 16 Op. Att’y Gen. 6, 9–12 (1992) (referring
to Durand v. Hollins, the Boxer Rebellion, Robert Jackson’s British Flying Students
opinion, and President Johnson’s actions in the Dominican Republic, and especially
emphasizing the Korean War as a precedent for a constitutional authority to implement
Security Council resolutions concerning Somalia).
197 Id. at 9.
198 See Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. O.L.C. 173, 177–78, 178 n.7
(1994) (noting both that the President has broad authority to use the armed forces without
congressional authorization and that the use of such forces in Haiti was unquestionably
legal under international law given the Security Council resolution).
199 See Proposed Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces into Bosnia, 19 Op. O.L.C. 327,
332–33 (1995) (stating that the President has the authority to deploy armed forces into
Bosnia without congressional authorization given the U.S. interests in promoting stability
in the former Yugoslavia and protecting the credibility and effectiveness of “a NATO
operation that carries out a peace agreement supported by the United Nations”).
200 Interestingly, there is no publicly available written OLC opinion regarding the
initiation of the use of force in Kosovo. For discussion of the OLC opinion addressing
Kosovo and the War Powers Resolution’s sixty-day clock, see infra note 222 and
accompanying text. At various times, administration officials suggested that the NATO
campaign was implicitly authorized by Security Council resolutions, Sean D. Murphy,
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 93 AM. J. INT’L
L. 628, 631–32 (1999), but the State Department Legal Adviser did not provide an opinion
to this effect. See infra note 220 and accompanying text; see also Michael J. Matheson,
Justification for the NATO Air Campaign in Kosovo, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 301, 301
(2000) (“[N]o single factor or doctrine seemed to be entirely satisfactory to all NATO
members as a justification under traditional legal standards.”).
201 See Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces into Haiti, 28 Op. O.L.C. 30, 33 (2004)
(declaring that the President could consider the Security Council resolution regarding
Haiti when “evaluating the foreign policy and national security interests of the United
States that are at stake in Haiti” and deciding how to use “his authority as Commander in
Chief”).
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2011, which was authorized by the Security Council and eventually
carried out through NATO (after initial actions by the United States
and certain allies).202 By the time of the Libya intervention, OLC had
a long line of precedents since the War Powers Resolution that it
could cite for the proposition that the President could constitutionally
initiate the use of force, at least up to a fairly high threshold, where
the President “could reasonably determine that such use of force was
in the national interest.”203
Logically, this broad language suggests that executive branch law-
yers would conclude that the President could constitutionally order
uses of force abroad purely for the humanitarian protection of citizens
of other countries, provided that the President views this as within the
national interest. Yet President Obama, at least, has proven reluctant
to do so where such a use of force would violate international law. The
striking example is Obama’s response after the Syrian regime crossed
what he called a “red line” by apparently using chemical weapons
against its own population in 2013.204 As the Obama Administration
recognized, a responsive strike against Syria would have difficulty
“fit[ting] under a traditionally recognized legal basis under interna-
tional law,”205 since Russia would doubtless veto a Security Council
authorization and the strike would not be in self-defense. Instead, as
an international legal justification, the United States would probably
have had to rely on something akin to pure humanitarian interven-
tion.206 This is a position the United States had never before cited as
its sole basis for a use of force under international law and which,
while it has its advocates, is difficult to reconcile with the text of the
202 See Auth. to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C., 2011 WL 1459998, at
*10–12 (O.L.C. Apr. 1, 2011).
203 Id. at *1, *8 (suggesting a possible constitutional limit on “prolonged and substantial
military engagements, typically involving exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant
risk over a substantial period”).
204 Albert R. Hunt, Obama’s Red Line Comes Back to Haunt Him, INT’L N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/politics/obamas-red-line-comes-
back-to-haunt-him.html.
205 Charlie Savage, Obama Tests Limits of Power in Syrian Conflict, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/09/world/middleeast/obama-tests-limits-of-
power-in-syrian-conflict.html (quoting White House counsel Kathryn Ruemmler).
206 See id. (further quoting the White House Counsel as saying that a strike would
nonetheless be “justified and legitimate under international law,” presumably a reference
to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention). In addition, the United States would have
acted without its traditional ally, as Britain’s Parliament voted against the use of force.
Mark Landler, David E. Sanger & Thom Shanker, Obama Set for Limited Strike on Syria
as British Vote No, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/30/us/
politics/obama-syria.html.
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U.N. Charter.207 As New York Times reporter Charlie Savage noted,
Obama’s attempt “to deal with the novelty of the crisis in interna-
tional law [became] entangled in the separate domestic law question
of whether the president could order strikes on Syria without Con-
gressional permission.”208 The White House Counsel explained to him
that, “[b]ecause it would be ‘more controversial for the president to
act alone in these circumstances’ as a matter of international law, it
would be better to get Congress on board as a matter of domestic law
‘to enhance the legitimacy’ of the action.”209 Ultimately, Obama
decided to seek congressional authorization,210 a decision that quickly
became moot after a diplomatic solution was found to resolve the
crisis.211
2. The Continuation of Hostilities
Prior to the War Powers Resolution, neither international law nor
domestic law set any fixed time limits on the use of force. Although
the provision in the War Powers Resolution requiring withdrawal
from hostilities within sixty days in the absence of congressional
authorization is a matter purely of domestic law, in practice its exis-
tence may also affect executive branch decisionmaking and doctrinal
reasoning with respect to treaties and collective security.212
207 See GRAY, supra note 29, at 51 (observing that “the doctrine is far from firmly
established in international law”); cf. Saira Mohamed, Taking Stock of the Responsibility to
Protect, 48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 319, 321–23 (2012) (describing the rise of the related norm
that the international community has a responsibility to protect victims of massive human
rights violations when the state in which these violations occur fails to do so).
208 Savage, supra note 205.
209 CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS: INSIDE OBAMA’S POST-9/11 PRESIDENCY 652
(2015) (quoting White House Counsel Kathryn Ruemmler).
210 Savage, supra note 205. The White House Counsel stated that Obama believed he
had the constitutional authority to act unilaterally, but that he sought congressional
authorization to “have it be seen, again as a matter of legitimacy both domestically and
internationally, that there was a unified American response to the horrendous violation of
the international norm against chemical weapons use.” Id.
211 See Michael R. Gordon, U.S. and Russia Reach Deal to Destroy Syria’s Chemical
Arms, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/world/middleeast/
syria-talks.html?_r=0.
212 Indeed, the status of the sixty-day clock under domestic law has been questioned, as
executive branch lawyers have sometimes suggested that it is unconstitutional. See
STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION 167–71, 179–80, 203–04 (2013)
(discussing the executive branch’s resistance to ceding authority over the use of force to
Congress and noting that lawyers in the administrations of Nixon, George H.W. Bush, and
George W. Bush argued that the War Powers Resolution was unconstitutional or did not
actually limit the President’s inherent authority to use the military). Nonetheless, this clock
has cast a significant shadow on the legal reasoning made within the executive branch
regarding the continuation of hostilities. See FISHER, supra note 14, at 150 (observing that
“[m]ilitary operations in Grenada and Panama were conducted as though the 60-day limit
was enforceable—if not legally, then politically”).
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As a doctrinal matter, the sixty-day clock has appeared to incen-
tivize executive branch lawyers to construe congressional authoriza-
tions broadly in ways that interconnect with how the executive branch
interprets international legal obligations.213 The aftermath of the first
Gulf War illustrates this point. The Security Council had authorized
the intervention in Resolution 678 and the congressional statute then
simply authorized the President to “use United States Armed Forces
pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678.”214 In
carrying out these authorizations, President Bush initially hued closely
to their mandate and did not go further in seeking to overthrow
Saddam Hussein. Yet following the initial conclusion of the first Gulf
War and the ceasefire established in a later Security Council resolu-
tion, the Bush and later the Clinton Administrations sought to create
“no-fly zones” over areas of northern and southern Iraq. In essence,
the executive branch claimed that Iraq was in violation of the
ceasefire and therefore that (1) the authority to use force could be
inferred from Security Council resolutions for international law pur-
poses,215 and (2) the congressional statute continued to apply for
domestic law purposes, thus serving as an authorization that satisfied
the sixty-day clock.216 These seemingly parallel arguments, however,
were not perfectly parallel, as Congress but not the Security Council
came to signal its approval for the executive branch’s approach.217 In
213 In the domestic law context, Harold Koh has described this kind of aggressive
statutory interpretation as the game of “‘Find the Statute,’ or less colloquially, ‘The Hunt
for Allegedly Delegated Prior Executive Authority.’” Harold Hongju Koh, War and
Responsibility in the Dole-Gingrich Congress, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 14 (1995).
214 Pub. L. No. 102-1, § 2(a), 105 Stat. 3, 3 (1991) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1541 (2012)). The resolution stated that it “constitute[d] specific statutory authorization”
for purposes of the War Powers Resolution, thus removing the sixty-day clock. Id.
§ 2(c)(1), 105 Stat. at 4.
215 See GRAY, supra note 29, at 349–51 (discussing this issue).
216 See GRIMMETT, supra note 38, at 6–8 (describing exchanges between the political
branches on this issue).
217 A provision in an appropriations bill gave the “sense of the Congress” that Iraq was
in noncompliance with Resolution 687, which had set forth the terms for the ceasefire at
the end of the first Gulf War, and that “the Congress supports the use of all necessary
means to achieve the goals of Security Council Resolution 687 as being consistent with the
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution.” Pub. L. No. 102-190,
§ 1095, 105 Stat. 1488, 1488 (1991). Another provision in this appropriations bill signaled
support for reading Congress’s earlier authorization broadly enough to apply to Security
Council Resolution 688, which demanded that Iraq improve its treatment of the Kurds. See
id., § 1096, 105 Stat. at 1489 (noting that “the Congress supports the use of all necessary
means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 consistent
with . . . the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution”).
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effect, the executive branch transfused its willingness to engage in
energetic statutory construction into the international legal context.218
Executive branch lawyers for President George W. Bush took
these broad readings of the Iraq-related Security Council resolutions
and widened them. In 2002, OLC concluded that President Bush had
the authority to invade Iraq under international law, based on an
exceptionally capacious reading of Resolution 678 and related resolu-
tions.219 Although Bush was on weak international legal grounds in
invading Iraq, he had clear domestic legal authority as a result of the
2002 AUMF—yet another example of how legal strength in one body
of law can potentially increase the likelihood that a president will act
despite legal weakness in the other body of law.
Between the two Gulf Wars, President Clinton had to confront a
question about the continuation of hostilities in Kosovo during
NATO’s bombing campaign. From the perspective of the interactive
dynamic, Kosovo is an unusual case, as its legality under both interna-
tional and domestic law was problematic. Unlike the Libya operation,
the Kosovo operation lacked clear Security Council authorization and
indeed the Legal Adviser declined to provide an opinion saying that it
was legal under international law.220 Nevertheless, because of the
humanitarian nature of the operation and the multinational commit-
ment of NATO, international criticism was limited, and the operation
is often cited for the possibility that sometimes the use of force might
218 Furthermore, because the United States needed the energetic construction of the
Security Council resolutions in order to deal with the sixty-day clock domestically, it had
little incentive to explore other international legal justifications, such as trying to argue for
an emerging norm of humanitarian intervention. (By contrast, the British came to defend
their participation in creating the no-fly zones based on the principle of humanitarian
intervention. GRAY, supra note 29, at 36–37.) For another example of how the sixty-day
clock may help shape the international legal arguments put forward by the United States in
justification of operations against ISIL, see supra note 160.
219 Auth. of the President Under Domestic and Int’l Law to Use Military Force Against
Iraq, 26 Op. O.L.C. 143, 162–73 (2002) (relying heavily on U.S. practice in interpreting
international law); see also William H. Taft IV & Todd F. Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq, and
International Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 557, 559–63 (2003) (arguing that the U.S. use of force
against Iraq was legal under international law because it was in accord with Security
Council Resolution 1441, passed in 2002).
220 See SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 71, at 124–25 (discussing the rationale behind
the Legal Adviser’s failure to write an opinion concerning the legal justification for the
intervention in Kosovo); see also President William J. Clinton, Address to the Nation on
Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) (Mar. 24, 1999), in 1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES: WILLIAM J. CLINTON 1999, at 451, 451–53 (2000) (justifying the operation to the
nation on the grounds of humanitarianism and the need to protect national interests);
Murphy, supra note 200, at 631–32 (discussing international legal justifications for the
operation provided by executive branch spokesmen).
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be “illegal but legitimate” under international law.221 As a matter of
domestic law, even accepting that President Clinton had the constitu-
tional authority to initiate the campaign, this campaign was problem-
atic under the War Powers Resolution since it lasted more than sixty
days and yet was not expressly authorized by Congress. Nonetheless,
OLC claimed that there was no violation of the Resolution because
Congress had in effect authorized it through the enactment of supple-
mental appropriations measures needed to fund the operation.222
Although the Kosovo intervention was a NATO-based operation,
this factor did not particularly affect the executive branch’s formal
analysis in relation to the War Powers Resolution. By contrast, the
structure of NATO involvement proved important to the controversy
over the sixty-day clock in the 2011 Libya intervention. According to
news accounts, OLC advised the President that he did not have the
authority to continue the U.S. operations in Libya when the sixty-day
clock expired.223 But other executive branch lawyers—most notably,
the State Department’s Legal Adviser, Harold Koh—argued that a
continuation of the operation would not violate the Resolution, and
Obama accepted that conclusion. Specifically, Koh’s argument was
that, all things considered, the U.S. role in the bombing campaign did
not constitute “hostilities” within the meaning of the Resolution.224 In
reaching this conclusion, Koh remarked that before the sixty-day
clock had run, the United States had turned command of the mission
over to NATO and was now playing a “constrained and supporting
role.”225 Besides emphasizing the structural role played by NATO,
Koh also referred to strong international legal and political support
for the mission, noting that it was a “NATO-led, Security-Council
authorized operation.”226 Once again, we see international law argu-
ments pressed into service for a domestic legal justification.
221 See, e.g., INDEP. INT’L COMM’N ON KOS., THE KOSOVO REPORT 4 (2000) (“The
Commission concludes that the NATO military intervention was illegal but legitimate.”).
But cf. Anthea Roberts, Legality vs Legitimacy: Can Uses of Force Be Illegal but Justified?,
in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERVENTION, AND THE USE OF FORCE 179, 184–88 (Philip Alston &
Euan MacDonald eds., 2008) (critiquing the “illegal but justified” concept).
222 Auth. for Continuing Hostilities in Kos., 24 Op. O.L.C. 327, 327 (2000). OLC made
this argument notwithstanding the fact that the Resolution specifically provides that
authorization to use force is not to be inferred from “any provision contained in any
appropriation Act.” 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a)(1) (2012).
223 Charlie Savage, 2 Top Lawyers Lost to Obama in Libya War Policy Debate,
N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/18/world/africa/
18powers.html?_r=0.
224 Koh Testimony, supra note 22, at 8–9.
225 Id. at 3, 8.
226 Id. at 10.
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V
IMPLICATIONS OF THE INTERACTIVE DYNAMIC
In this Part, we consider some implications of the interactive
dynamic. First, we discuss the relevance of the dynamic for current
scholarly debates over the law on the use of force, both domestically
and internationally. Next, we consider its implications for the deci-
sionmaking of war powers actors, in particular Congress, the
President, and the Security Council. We conclude by discussing how
the dynamic both confirms and complicates the role that law plays in
presidential decisions to use military force.
A. Implications for War Powers Scholarship
The interactive dynamic has implications both for foreign rela-
tions law scholarship concerning the President’s constitutional
authority to use military force, and for international legal scholarship
concerning the authority of nations to use military force. While our
analysis does not resolve normative questions about appropriate
methods of legal interpretation or what the law on the use of force
should be, it does shed light on how the executive branch approaches
these issues in practice. Our central insight is that scholars seeking to
understand how U.S. uses of force relate to law need to consider both
bodies of law in order to fully appreciate what is going on with respect
to each body. We consider more specific implications below.
1. U.S. War Powers Scholarship
Much of modern scholarship concerning the President’s constitu-
tional authority to use military force is originalist in its methodology.
That is, it considers how the Constitution’s distribution of war
authority would have been understood at the time of the Founding.
Most of this scholarship has concluded that the Constitution was
understood as requiring congressional authorization for non-defensive
uses of military force.227
As this Article makes clear, however, these originalist accounts
do not map well onto either the actual practice of presidential uses of
227 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 14, at 3; FISHER, supra note 14, at 6–12; FRANCIS D.
WORMUTH & EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, TO CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR 18 (2d ed. 1989); Lofgren,
supra note 12, at 697, 699; Saikrishna Prakash, Unleashing the Dogs of War: What the
Constitution Means by “Declare War,” 93 CORNELL L. REV. 45 (2007); William Michael
Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695,
698–99 (1997); see also Ramsey, supra note 13, at 1546–47 (arguing that the President is
not authorized to order military attacks without congressional approval, but that the
President may take certain unilateral executive actions, including military force, that do
not create a state of war).
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force or the legal reasoning offered to justify this practice. Presidential
war powers have evolved, and there is no reason to believe that U.S.
practice will return to the narrower conception of presidential power
evident in the early years of the nation. Among other things, the
nature of the security threats to the United States are substantially
different from what they were at the Founding; U.S. foreign policy
interests have become much more complex and global in scope; presi-
dents have at their disposal a large standing military, something that
was not true at the Founding; and Congress, for partisan and other
reasons, often acquiesces in presidential unilateralism.
Some non-originalist scholarship, by contrast, has given weight to
historical practice in discerning the scope of the President’s war
powers authority. These accounts typically make an effort, like OLC
in the Obama Administration, to distinguish between smaller-scale
uses of force and larger conflicts. Peter Spiro contends, for example,
that, although presidents have the authority to carry out limited mili-
tary operations on their own authority, congressional authorization is
needed to wage “real war”—that is, “the massive use of force against
an enemy itself capable of marshalling substantial force.”228 Jane
Stromseth concludes more narrowly that, although historical practice
supports a presidential power to use “limited force to rescue Amer-
ican citizens abroad whose lives are in imminent danger,” such prac-
tice does not clearly support a broader presidential authority to
engage in “little wars.”229
While these practice-based analyses offer more realistic accounts
than originalism of the modern constitutional law of presidential war
powers, this Article suggests that they are incomplete. In particular,
these analyses have not given sufficient attention either to the inter-
connections between U.S. war powers practice and international law
or to the dynamic relationship between domestic and international
law in this area.230 For example, because Professor Spiro does not con-
sider how Security Council authorizations have helped the President
228 Peter J. Spiro, War Powers and the Sirens of Formalism, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1338,
1348 (1993) (reviewing ELY, supra note 14). Some scholars have interpreted the historical
practice more expansively. E.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 50 B.U. L.
REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 19, 27 (1970) (contending, during the Vietnam War, that “the
teaching of our history” is that “presidents have employed that amount of force that they
deemed necessary to accomplish their foreign policy objectives” and that “the only
limitation upon presidential power has been that imposed by political considerations”).
229 See Stromseth, Why Methodology Matters, supra note 58, at 882–86.
230 For scholarship attentive to interconnections between domestic and international law
as it relates to the President’s conduct of a war once begun, see David Golove, Military
Tribunals, International Law, and the Constitution: A Franckian-Madisonian Approach, 35
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 363, 378–94 (2003); Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President
Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97, 154–79 (2004); and Ingrid
October 2016] PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS 747
in claiming greater constitutional authority,231 he is perhaps too opti-
mistic in asserting that historical practice can maintain a firm distinc-
tion between “real war” and smaller engagements. The example of the
Korean War (and of the executive branch’s continued invocation of
this war as a precedent at least up until recently) shows how interna-
tional authorizations can serve to tilt constitutional practice. Professor
Stromseth does consider the doctrinal question of whether Security
Council resolutions can substitute for congressional authorization,232
but she does not consider how these substitutions can shape historical
practice in ways that favor presidential power irrespective of the inter-
national legal context. Overall, the interactive dynamic described in
this Article, by positing that customary practice is multi-dimensional,
suggests that the lines drawn by practice can shift more rapidly and
more substantially than might otherwise be anticipated.
2. International Legal Scholarship
Most international legal scholarship on the use of force includes
extensive discussion of U.S. practice but pays little attention to U.S.
internal law on the use of force.233 This makes sense as a purely doc-
trinal matter, as international law formally develops without consider-
ation of the internal laws and procedures of particular nations. Yet for
international legal scholars who are interested in understanding more
than just the formal doctrine, our account has considerable relevance.
As we have shown, understanding U.S. domestic law on the use of
force is crucial for understanding how the United States conceptual-
Brunk Wuerth, International Law and Constitutional Interpretation: The Commander in
Chief Clause Reconsidered, 106 MICH. L. REV. 61, 74–80 (2007).
231 See Spiro, supra note 228, at 1348–60 (discussing various past practices but not
referencing the Security Council or international law on the use of force). In prior writing,
one of us similarly focused only on the domestic elements of historical practice in assessing
the relevance of that practice to presidential war powers. See Bradley & Morrison, supra
note 56, at 461–68.
232 Stromseth, Rethinking War Powers, supra note 68, at 893, 902–06 (concluding that
congressional authorization was not needed for the Security Council-authorized
peacekeeping mission in Bosnia but that Security Council resolutions should not substitute
for congressional authorizations in more war-like contexts); see also Stromseth, Why
Methodology Matters, supra note 58, at 621–54 (considering the import of the Security
Council resolutions for the constitutional issue in Korea and the first Gulf War); cf. Ganesh
Sitaraman & David Zionts, Behaviorial War Powers, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 516, 562 (2015)
(contending that “[t]he lessons of behavioral psychology suggest that situations in which
the U.N. authorizes the use of force may be less troubling than situations in which the U.N.
does not authorize force”).
233 E.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 25, at 294–300 (discussing use of force in the Gulf War);
FRANCK, supra note 133, at 86–96, 152–55 (describing uses of force by the U.S. for defense
of citizens abroad and humanitarian intervention); GRAY, supra note 29, at 193–234
(discussing use of force in Kosovo); RUYS, supra note 63, at 305–18, 433–47 (discussing use
of force after 9/11).
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izes and engages with international law on the use of force. Because
the United States plays such a major role in relation to international
law on the use of force—even though U.S. positions on this law are
often in tension with prevailing interpretations—U.S. domestic law on
the use of force has an important, though indirect, effect on the shape
and development of international law.
In particular, our findings suggest that international legal scholars
trying to understand U.S. practice should pay close attention to the
relationship between the President and Congress. Currently, scholars
examining U.S. behavior focus almost exclusively on presidents as
decision-makers. For example, some recent scholarly works focus
extensively on how Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama
do or do not differ in their approach to international law on the use of
force without ever considering how the U.S. separation of powers
might affect this issue.234 As we have shown, however, the presence or
absence of congressional authorization is relevant to how willing a
President may be to interpret international law permissively on the
use of force. The 2001 AUMF, for example, helps explain the con-
tinuity between the Bush Administration and the Obama
Administration with respect to the war on terror, as it can be inter-
preted to give the President domestic authorization to engage in
actions that may be questionable as a matter of international law.235
Finally, at a higher level of generality, our findings contribute to
the developing body of scholarship on “comparative international
law.”236 As Anthea Roberts puts it, “[h]ow international law is
received and understood within a domestic system is likely to depend
on underlying cognitive grids, which are shaped by domestic legal
training.”237 We have shown how domestic legal approaches with
234 See generally, e.g., CHRISTIAN HENDERSON, THE PERSISTENT ADVOCATE AND THE
USE OF FORCE: THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES UPON THE JUS AD BELLUM IN THE
POST-COLD WAR ERA (2010) (studying the relationship between U.S. uses of force and
international law but with no mention of the U.S. constitutional separation of powers and
only brief references to the AUMFs); AIDEN WARREN & INGVILD BODE, GOVERNING THE
USE-OF-FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE POST 9/11 US CHALLENGE ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2014) (focusing extensively on the acts of the Bush and Obama
Administrations under international law without discussing the U.S. separation of powers);
Christine Gray, President Obama’s 2010 United States National Security Strategy and
International Law on the Use of Force, 10 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 35 (2011) (analyzing the
extent to which the Obama Administration is continuing the approaches of the Bush
Administration without discussing U.S. separation of powers).
235 See supra text accompanying notes 151–54.
236 Early contributions include Martti Koskenniemi, The Case for Comparative
International Law, 20 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 1 (2009), and Anthea Roberts, Comparative
International Law? The Role of National Courts in Creating and Enforcing International
Law, 60 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 57 (2011).
237 Roberts, supra note 236, at 75.
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regard to the use of force get transfused by executive branch lawyers
into the international arena. In both contexts, the executive branch
emphasizes practice rather than foundational texts, characterizes past
practices in ways that favor its positions, interprets statutes and reso-
lutions in a fairly free-form way, and resists resolution of use-of-force
questions by courts.
B. Implications for War Powers Actors
This Article has shown how institutional design, the open-
textured possibilities of practice-based legal interpretation, and inter-
actions between the domestic and international spheres all combine
over time to help justify vastly increased presidential war powers. In
what follows, we consider what our account suggests for those who
favor stronger legal restraints on the President’s unilateral authority
to use force or, at the very least, want to slow the erosion of these
restraints.238 These suggestions involve both a general attentiveness to
the interactive dynamic and some specific ideas about the drafting of
authorizations, the use of soft law mechanisms, and the treatment of
practice in legal interpretation.
1. Awareness of the Interactive Effect of
Authorizations to Use Force
Immediately after Congress’s approval of the 2002 AUMF for
Iraq, Hillary Clinton described her vote in favor as “probably the
hardest decision I’ve ever had to make.”239 She added that she
thought that “bipartisan support would make the president’s success
at the United Nations ‘more likely and, therefore, war less likely.’”240
Although potentially self-serving, this remark suggests that members
of Congress can indeed think in terms of the effects of their votes on
international actors. But it also suggests that they can get it wrong.
Instead of helping President Bush obtain the support of the Security
238 Although we do not take a position in this Article on the normatively appropriate
scope of presidential war powers, we focus on the implications for those interested in
restraint because, as we have shown, the current system already naturally works to the
advantage of those who favor the growth of presidential authority over time. We consider
only suggestions that we deem politically feasible. We thus do not suggest amendments to
the Constitution or the U.N. Charter. We similarly do not suggest changes to the War
Powers Resolution. To date, calls for such changes have been unavailing, although
members of Congress continue to put forth bills to that effect. See, e.g., S. 1939, 113th
Cong. (2014).
239 Alison Mitchell & Carl Hulse, Congress Authorizes Bush to Use Force Against Iraq,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/11/national/
11IRAQ.html?pagewanted=all.
240 Id. Clinton would later come to conclude that she got her vote “wrong. Plain and
simple.” HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, HARD CHOICES 127 (2014).
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Council, the 2002 AUMF provided domestic support for him to invade
Iraq on a tenuous international legal justification and with relatively
little international support.
Awareness of the interactive dynamic would help to predict this
consequence. The interactive dynamic suggests that an authorization
from Congress or the Security Council may reduce the likelihood that
the President will await an authorization by the other body.241 Mem-
bers of Congress should therefore be aware that when they authorize
uses of force, the President may be more likely to bypass the Security
Council and instead to push the boundaries of international law, as
with Iraq in 2002 and as has occurred to some degree with the war on
terror following the 2001 AUMF. Even if members of Congress are
unconcerned about international law per se, they should be aware
that, because of the interactive dynamic, changes in international law
can have consequences for domestic law over time. Members of the
Security Council should similarly be aware that when they authorize
uses of force, the President may use it to help justify bypassing
Congress, as with the Korean War and, on much more modest scales,
interventions in recent decades in Haiti, Bosnia, and Libya.
These implications should matter to members of Congress and of
the Security Council because, as we have shown, they have good
reason to care about the long-term structure of both bodies of law.
The more precedents the President has for using force under tenuous
international legal theories, the more comfortable the President may
feel in the future doing so even without Congressional authorizations.
Similarly, the more precedents the President has for acting without
Congress as a matter of domestic law, the more likely the President is
to use force abroad without a Security Council authorization or other
strong international legal grounding. To say that collective actors
should be aware of these possibilities is not to suggest that they should
decline to provide authorization when they think it is substantively
and institutionally warranted. Such awareness is relevant, however, to
the potential content of their authorizations and their responses to
unilateral action, as explained in the next two subsections.
241 Our claim is that it reduces the likelihood, not that it eliminates it. Presidents may
still seek authorization from the other collective actor if doing so is politically
advantageous and is relatively assured. As noted, for example, President George H.W.
Bush ultimately decided to obtain congressional authorization for the 1991 Gulf War even
after obtaining Security Council authorization. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
Moreover, the interactive dynamic will not always promote unilateralism, especially if
international authorization occurs first, since a strong basis for the use of force under
international law might make it easier for the President to obtain congressional
authorization.
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2. Decisions on What to Put in Authorizations for Uses of Force
The interactive dynamic also has implications for the content of
authorizations for the use of force. Indeed, in practice these implica-
tions are likely to be more important than the implications for
whether to authorize uses of force, which will mostly be driven by
perceived substantive and political imperatives. Once again, the
overall implication is that actors should try to limit the risks that their
authorization will loosen legal restraints with respect to the other
body of law at issue. They could achieve this by putting certain condi-
tions into their own authorizations—conditions that would further
protect against overly expansive interpretation of these authorizations
by the executive branch.
For Security Council authorizations, we suggest consideration of
limits related to domestic legal authority, time, and scope. As to
domestic legal authority, these authorizations could borrow the lan-
guage found in the NATO treaty and state that members are per-
mitted to use force in accordance with their “constitutional
processes.”242 This would not necessarily lead the President to seek
congressional authorization, but it could strengthen the hand of
domestic actors arguing that the President should do so, and it would
at least make it more difficult to argue that obtaining Security Council
authorization was a substitute for obtaining otherwise-required con-
gressional authorization.
As to time, past practice like the revival of the first Gulf War
resolutions to justify the second Gulf War offers plenty of reasons
why, regardless of the interactive dynamic, Security Council members
should consider time limits on authorizations.243 Yet the interactive
dynamic suggests that Security Council members should be particu-
larly aware of the sixty-day clock of the War Powers Resolution and
how it affects the domestic legal and political climate in which the
President operates. The Security Council’s authorization in Libya
indirectly helped to set a domestic precedent for finding the sixty-day
clock inapplicable, and this precedent might be used in the future in
contexts in which there is no Security Council resolution. To avoid
playing a role in further watering down the power of the sixty-day
clock, Security Council members could consider authorizing uses of
242 North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 186, art. 11.
243 Some Security Council resolutions related to peacekeeping already have used time
limits. E.g., S.C. Res. 743, ¶ 3 (Feb. 21, 1992) (establishing an initial one-year mission in
Bosnia).
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force for only short periods of time or at least establishing review
processes that would be engaged after some initial period.244
Finally, as to scope, limits placed by the Security Council could
reduce the risk of large-scale uses of force by the President without
congressional authorization. The Security Council authorization in
Libya, for example, explicitly “exclud[ed] a foreign occupation force
of any form on any part of Libyan territory.”245 Although no doubt
put in to assuage international concerns, this provision also may have
helped to reduce the risk as a matter of domestic law that hostilities
unauthorized by Congress would escalate into a commitment of U.S.
ground troops.
Members of Congress should consider similar kinds of limits in
congressional authorizations for uses of force. Its authorizations could
be tied to particular international legal justifications, as Eisenhower’s
authorization in the Middle East was tied to intervention by invita-
tion246 and the authorization for the first Gulf War was tied to
Resolution 678 of the Security Council.247 To protect against overly
expansive interpretations of these international legal justifications,
Congress could further include other limitations like sunset provi-
sions, definitions of the relevant enemy, and geographic specifications.
At least in some instances, presidents may be receptive to such limita-
tions. By way of example, the draft AUMF that President Obama sub-
mitted to Congress in February 2015 to address the conflict against
ISIL would have expressly declined to authorize “the use of the
United States Armed Forces in enduring offensive ground combat
operations,” would have terminated in three years unless reauthorized
by Congress, and would have repealed the 2002 AUMF relating to
Iraq.248
Carefully tailored authorizations would go a considerable dis-
tance to limiting the ways in which the interactive dynamic can con-
tribute to the long-term growth of presidential war powers.
Nonetheless, presidents might use their bargaining power in Congress
244 For a recent example in which the Security Council took express account of a time
period reflected in U.S. domestic law, see S.C. Resolution 2231, at ¶ 34(ii) (2015), which
set the operative date for relaxing sanctions against Iran, pursuant to an agreement to limit
Iran’s nuclear program, as ninety days after endorsement of the agreement by the Council,
a move designed to accommodate a domestic review process mandated by Congress. See
Somini Sengupta, U.N. Moves to Lift Iran Sanctions After Nuclear Deal, Setting up a Clash
in Congress, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/world/
middleeast/security-council-following-iran-nuclear-pact-votes-to-lift-sanctions.html
(describing the agreement).
245 S.C. Res. 1973, ¶ 4 (Mar. 17, 2011).
246 See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text.
247 See supra notes 212–14 and accompanying text.
248 Draft Joint Resolution, supra note 162, §§ 2(c), 3, 6.
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and the Security Council to resist the adoption of such limits. More-
over, while major uses of force by the United States typically involve
an authorization by either Congress or the Security Council, there are
nonetheless many situations in which the President uses force without
any formal authorization—typically in some form of asserted self-
defense. Because of this, it is important to consider how the interac-
tive dynamic can affect other aspects of the legal processes involved in
decisions on the use of force.
3. Soft Law Mechanisms
Where the President is considering a use of force without authori-
zation from Congress or from the Security Council, the institutional
design of these actors makes it highly unlikely that they will formally
oppose the President’s actions through their lawmaking processes. Yet
their members and other actors have various “soft law” mechanisms
that they can use to try to pressure the President into a decision not to
use force or, if hostilities are ongoing, to tamper down or terminate
these hostilities.249 For members of Congress, these methods include
hearings, committee reports, non-binding resolutions, resistance to
funding the hostilities or to other aspects of the President’s agenda,
behind-the-scenes conversations with the White House, and communi-
cations with the public. For other nations, these methods include
public and private protests, non-cooperation with (or even opposition
to) the United States on this use of force or on other issues, and ges-
tures of disagreement expressed in other international fora. Such
resistance not only serves to signal political objections, but also can
influence practice-based legal developments. As one of us has argued
in the domestic context, these signals can be considered in measuring
Congress’s nonacquiescence to an executive branch practice.250 In the
international context, acquiescence or nonacquiescence by nations to
the subsequent practice of the United States is important to the
impact of these practices on doctrine. The vote in the General
Assembly against the U.S. invasion of Grenada, for example, under-
249 Cf. Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional
Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 586–99 (2008) (describing ways that soft law can influence
behavior in the context of statutory interpretation); Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A.
Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International
Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 727–43 (2010) (characterizing the relationships
between hard and soft law in the international sphere).
250 Bradley & Morrison, supra note 56, at 450; see also Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v.
Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2563 (2014) (treating resistance by congressional
committees to presidential practice as relevant in assessing historical practice).
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cuts the argument that this invasion was a legitimate exercise of the
right of self-defense.251
The interactive dynamic has implications for the most effective
deployments of soft law. Perhaps most importantly, actors seeking to
resist presidential action through soft law should consider the context
with respect to the other body of law in determining when to time
their acts of resistance. If the President is most likely to be responsive
to concerns about the use of force when getting pressure in both the
international and domestic context, then actors in each context should
consider timing their opposition accordingly. While the initiation of
hostilities is usually the most crucial time at international law, in the
domestic context both the initiation of hostilities and the end of the
sixty-day clock of the War Powers Resolution have particular salience.
Thus other nations might wish to time gestures of opposition not only
at times leading up to the initiation of hostilities, but also sixty days in,
so as to add pressure on presidents at a moment when they are on
weaker grounds domestically. As for members of Congress, if the
President is on weak international legal ground, then they would want
to put particular pressure to bear before or at the time of the initial
use of force. On the other hand, if the President is on strong interna-
tional legal ground they might instead focus their efforts on empha-
sizing the sixty-day clock of the War Powers Resolution.
Soft law mechanisms can also be used to signal approval of presi-
dential action. Where the President is on strong ground under interna-
tional law, members of Congress might wish to emphasize the
significance of this fact to their acquiescence in a presidential use of
force. Doing so would help limit the scope of their acquiescence. By
way of example, the more the Obama Administration’s interpretation
of “hostilities” for purposes of the sixty-day clock in the Libya inter-
vention is explicitly linked to the Security Council resolution (or to
NATO involvement), the harder it will be for future administrations
to use this interpretation in the absence of these factors. Nonetheless,
the effectiveness of limits built into congressional acquiescence
depends in large part on the willingness of future executive branch
actors to recognize these limits. As we have shown, however, the exec-
utive branch instead tends to read past practices broadly in favor of
presidential power. Because of this, it is important to also consider
ways in which the use of practice in legal interpretation can be
disciplined.
251 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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4. Treatment of Practice in Legal Interpretation
In the past, the interactive dynamic has aided executive branch
lawyers in expansive interpretations of past practice. Over time, this
Article has shown, these interpretations have led to increasingly broad
claims of legal authority in both domestic and international law. Insti-
tutionally, these trends are helped by the fact that executive branch
lawyers may consider it in the interest of their client to be public
about the breadth of presidential war powers and silent or private
about the limits. As Trevor Morrison has put it in relation to OLC,
“written precedents could become weighted more toward client-
friendly conclusions than the totality of all its legal advice, oral and
written combined.”252
The soft law mechanisms discussed above might help encourage
executive branch lawyers to be less expansive in their interpretation of
past practice. In addition, our account of the interactive dynamic pro-
vides insights for executive lawyers interested in preserving the
restraining effect of law. While this possibility might seem fanciful,
interests in restraint could come from intrinsic fidelity to law or from
substantive concerns about the absence of legal restraints. Executive
branch actors might favor restraints because of distrust of future presi-
dents or, on the international law side, out of concerns that the ero-
sion of international legal standards will increase the risk of
undesirable actions by other nations.253 Articulating meaningful
restraints can also be a way of enhancing the President’s credibility
when using force.254
Most powerfully, executive branch lawyers can refuse to give
opinions that certain uses of force are legal. With regard to Kosovo,
for example, the Legal Adviser of the State Department declined to
provide an opinion that this intervention was lawful under interna-
tional law.255 Although the intervention went forward nonetheless, the
absence of such an opinion has left its footprint on U.S. practice. Had
252 Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 1448, 1469 (2010).
253 Cf. Pierre-Hugues Verdier & Erik Voeten, Precedent, Compliance, and Change in
Customary International Law: An Explanatory Theory, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 389, 401–02
(2014) (arguing that one reason that nations comply with rules of customary international
law is a concern about setting precedents that could weaken the legal effect of the rules for
other nations). A concern about precedent may be one reason why presidents have not
advocated any general right to engage in humanitarian intervention. See SCHARF &
WILLIAMS, supra note 71, at 124–26.
254 Cf. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV.
865, 868 (2007) (considering “mechanisms of executive self-binding that send a signal of
credibility by committing presidents to actions or policies that only a well-motivated
president would adopt”).
255 See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
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such an opinion existed and concluded that humanitarian intervention
is authorized by international law, it might have increased presidential
willingness down the road to advance this international legal justifica-
tion. As noted earlier, the United States considered advancing this
justification in relation to responding to the Assad regime’s use of
chemical weapons, but ultimately President Obama decided not to use
force without congressional backing.256
Even within legal opinions finding uses of force to be lawful,
there are ways that executive branch lawyers can narrow the prece-
dential scope of these opinions. One way is for executive branch
actors to clearly identify limits to executive branch authority, ideally
using language stronger than “possible.”257 A second way is for execu-
tive branch lawyers to try to rest their arguments on the narrow or
single justifications rather than on broad or multi-factor ones. The
OLC memorandum in support of the Libya intervention, for example,
identified both regional stability and preserving the credibility of the
Security Council as important national interests that the President
could deem advanced by this intervention.258 A focus solely on the
Security Council would have been a narrower ground—one that
would reduce the likelihood of Libya being used as a precedent in
situations where the international legal justification was much weaker.
Yet a third way would be for the executive branch to be more rigorous
in evaluating past practice. In assessing legality under international
law, for example, executive branch lawyers could focus less on U.S.
practice and more on international practice generally.
* * *
The prospects for restraint suggested above are modest ones.
Formal action from Congress and the Security Council is difficult to
obtain, and the executive branch has considerable incentives to favor
the long-term expansion of presidential war powers. In addition, the
President is often on a sound basis in one body of law even without a
specific authorization. On the domestic law side, the President’s con-
stitutional power to use force for the rescue of citizens abroad is now
well-established from the perspective of practice and, increasingly, the
256 See supra notes 208–10 and accompanying text.
257 Cf. Auth. to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C., 2011 WL 1459998, at *8
(O.L.C. Apr. 1, 2011) (suggesting that “prolonged and substantial military engagements”
“may” be subject to a “possible constitutionally-based limit” on Presidential action without
prior congressional authorization).
258 Id. at *10–12. The OLC memorandum focuses on the “combination” of these
interests, but elsewhere suggests that interests standing “alone” can also justify action. See,
e.g., id. at *10–13.
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President’s authority to use force abroad for other interests—at least
up to a certain threshold and before the triggering of the sixty-day
clock—is becoming or has become the same. On the international law
side, the Charter-sanctioned principle of self-defense and accompa-
nying practice, along with the rise of consent-based interventions,
place the United States on sound, or at least plausible, footing under
international law for many uses of force.
More robust constraints would likely require the intervention of
courts. As discussed earlier, courts currently play very little role in
policing the executive branch’s legal interpretations on the use of
force,259 and their absence encourages the practice-based expansions
we have documented in this piece. On the domestic law side, if the
federal courts showed even slightly more receptivity to adjudicating
use-of-force cases, through relaxation of traditional limitations such as
the political question doctrine, they could potentially trigger more
restraints on presidential action.260 On the international law side, it is
unlikely that in the future the United States will formally accept the
authority of an international court to adjudicate the legality of uses of
force.261 But such court decisions (regardless of whether they involve
the United States as a party) might nonetheless increase the cost of
broad legal interpretations by the United States.
C. Law and Presidential Decisionmaking
In recounting the interactive dynamic relating to war powers, this
Article has assumed that law matters at least to some extent in this
context. If law does not have direct or indirect effects on presidential
decisions to use military force, then the dynamic described here would
be immaterial to policy: presidents would make the same decisions
about whether to use force regardless of whether they were able to
259 See supra text accompanying notes 49–51.
260 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The Coase Theorem and the War Power: A Response,
41 DUKE L.J. 122, 122–23 (1991) (describing how a federal district court decision prior to
the first Gulf War helped nudge the first Bush Administration into seeking congressional
authorization).
261 See supra note 51 (discussing the U.S. reaction to the Nicaragua decision). While in
the future the International Criminal Court (ICC) may have authority to impose individual
criminal liability for violations of the law on the use of force, this would not apply to U.S.
citizens unless the United States were to join the ICC. See Dapo Akande, What Exactly
Was Agreed in Kampala on the Crime of Aggression?, EQ, Nov. 2010, at 23, 24–25 (“[T]he
Court may not exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression when committed by a
national of a non-State Party or on its territory.”). Even though other decisions of the ICJ
(such as its advisory opinion on the use of nuclear weapons) and any future decisions of the
ICC on the use of force thus have no formal binding effect on the United States or its
leaders, these decisions nonetheless can matter for the United States because of their
import for international law more generally.
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shift between international law and domestic law justifications, and
regardless of whether they were able to broaden legal doctrine over
time. If so, the interactive dynamic would be an important part of
rhetoric and argumentation, but not something that policymakers
should be attentive to in thinking about the evolution of presidential
war powers. This question of legal effect is therefore significant, but it
is also very difficult to assess empirically.262
Some scholars doubt that law concerning the use of force matters
much at all.263 The stakes are high for decisions on the use of force,
which puts more strain on the fidelity to legal norms. There is also
little judicial review available to check presidential compliance with
the law in either the international or domestic context. And, as this
Article has documented, the practice of presidential use of force has
departed substantially from the textual assignments of war powers and
what most observers consider the original understanding of those
assignments. On a few occasions, policymakers are even candid in
their internal deliberations that they are acting regardless of legality.
After President Johnson ordered an intervention in the Dominican
Republic, for example, the legal justification drafted by the State
Department was post hoc and so unimpressive that future Supreme
Court justice Abe Fortas deemed “its soundness as a matter of legal
262 The difficulty of making an empirical assessment stems from a number of factors. For
decisionmaking in this area, such as whether to seek congressional or Security Council
authorization, there is likely to be a heavy overlap of legal and political considerations. Cf.
Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and
Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L REV. 1097, 1149 (2013) (noting the interactive nature of
law and politics with respect to issues of presidential power). In addition, there is an
asymmetry of available information. While we know of instances in which presidents have
decided to use force even when the law appeared to be unsupportive, we do not have
comparable knowledge of the instances in which presidents have decided not to use force,
although such instances undoubtedly happen. See SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 71, at
165 (quoting a former Legal Adviser who stated that “I’m sure each one of us at one point
or another has advised our clients not to use force in a situation and our advice was taken.
Certainly it happened for me at least twice, and once at the very highest level imaginable”);
Stromseth, Why Methodology Matters, supra note 58, at 877 (“The lists [of presidential
uses of force] do not include cases in which presidents refrained from using force because
they knew Congress would oppose it or because they were unsuccessful in obtaining
congressional authorization.”).
263 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW, PREROGATIVES OF POWER:
INTERVENTIONISM AFTER KOSOVO 207 (2001) (arguing that “by [the twentieth] century’s
end, the [UN] Charter’s use-of-force regime had become all but imaginary”); Eric Posner,
Obama Can Bomb Pretty Much Anything He Wants to, SLATE (Sept. 23, 2014, 11:39 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2014/09/war_ag
ainst_isis_in_syria_obama_s_legal_and_political_justifications.html (arguing that “[t]he
real constraint on a president’s war-making powers is political, not legal”).
October 2016] PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS 759
analysis . . . subject to effective challenge.”264 From this and other
examples, it is clear that law does not always carry the day.
Yet there are reasons to think that law relating to the use of force
plays a meaningful and sometimes dispositive role in presidential deci-
sionmaking. To begin with, presidents and their supporters spend sig-
nificant time and energy seeking to justify uses of force in legal terms.
They issue executive branch legal memoranda, testify before Con-
gress, make statements to the public, and send letters to the United
Nations all explaining why particular uses of force are legal under
domestic and international law. In doing so, they expose themselves to
potential criticism of their legal analysis—criticism that has the poten-
tial to undermine their credibility.265 And even when the content of
the law is debatable, legal argumentation is subject to plausibility
constraints.266
There are particular indications that, despite its significant limita-
tions, the War Powers Resolution has had a material impact on execu-
tive branch decisionmaking. Few unilateral uses of force by presidents
since enactment of the Resolution in 1973 have exceeded the Resolu-
tion’s sixty-day limit, and there are indications that presidents have
sometimes made an effort to conclude operations (such as in Grenada
and Panama) before the expiration of that period.267 Moreover, in
those instances in which it has appeared that the period was expiring,
such as with Kosovo in 1999 and Libya in 2011, presidents and their
advisors made strenuous efforts to explain why the Resolution was
not being violated. The Resolution also seems to have contributed to
the Obama Administration’s decision in 2014 to rely on preexisting
statutes for the use of force against ISIL rather than on the President’s
constitutional authority.268 In other instances in which the Resolu-
tion’s sixty-day clock has been implicated, such as in Lebanon in 1983
264 Fortas Memorandum, supra note 121, at 1.
265 In addition, they expose themselves to what Jon Elster has referred to as a
“consistency constraint” that limits their ability to change their position without seeming
opportunistic and hypocritical. See Jon Elster, Deliberation and Constitution Making, in
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 97, 104 (Jon Elster ed., 1998).
266 See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 262, at 1117 (“Even if the President is advised
that there is a minimally plausible argument in favor of the action in question, the law
might still constrain him not to act if the argument is perceived as being too weak.”).
267 See David P. Auerswald & Peter F. Cowhey, Ballotbox Diplomacy: The War Powers
Resolution and the Use of Force, 41 INT’L STUD. Q. 505 (1997) (examining the length of
unilateral uses of force since the War Powers Resolution).
268 See, e.g., Spencer Ackerman, White House Says Expired War Powers Timetable
Irrelevant to ISIS Campaign, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 16, 2014, 8:36 AM), http://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/oct/15/white-house-war-powers-resolution-iraq
(noting that the Obama Administration was claiming that, because its authority derived
from AUMFs enacted in 2001 and 2002, the sixty-day limit in the War Powers Resolution
did not apply).
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and Somalia in 1993–1994, Congress has itself acted to limit presiden-
tial uses of force. One reason why the Resolution may matter, as sug-
gested by two political scientists, is that it allows members of Congress
who oppose presidential uses of force to “cloak their actions in U.S.
law rather than appearing unpatriotic.”269
The various executive branch efforts at public legal justification
suggest that, at a minimum, presidents believe that there are impor-
tant audiences that care about legality. Potential audiences include
members of the President’s party in Congress, Congress as a whole,
the U.S. public (as informed by the media, scholarly experts, and
others), U.S. allies, and the international community more generally.
Even if one assumes that presidents care only about politics, legality
matters to presidential decisionmaking if, as seems likely, it can affect
the level of political support (domestic or international) for contem-
plated action. It is also plausible that there is some internalization of
legal norms relating to the use of force within the executive branch.
Presidents may themselves have internalized such norms or desire to
have a legacy that includes a reputation for legal fidelity. Reports
about President Obama’s decision to seek congressional authorization
in 2013 for using force against Syria are suggestive of such a prefer-
ence. As the Wall Street Journal reported, “Mr. Obama made no
secret to aides he felt uncomfortable acting without U.N. Security
Council backing.”270 Additionally, executive branch lawyers who
advise the President are likely to have internalized norms of both
fidelity to law and legal professionalism, which may limit the extent to
which they are willing to strain legal interpretation in support of presi-
dential policy.271
The analysis in this Article offers further insight into how law
may influence executive branch decisionmaking on the use of force.
Our account suggests that law matters in ways that will be overlooked
by those who focus only on domestic or international law. As we have
shown, there are remarkably few instances in which presidents have
used military force in the U.N. Charter era when they appeared to
lack plausible support in both domestic and international law. Instead,
instances in which they have strained international law have tended to
involve situations in which they had strong domestic legal support,
269 Auerswald & Cowhey, supra note 267, at 514.
270 Adam Entous & Carol E. Lee, At the Last Minute, Obama Alone Made Call to Seek
Congressional Approval, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 1, 2013, 12:56 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424127887324009304579047542466837078.
271 See Morrison, supra note 252, at 1502, 1518–19 (describing professional norms at
OLC); see also Bradley & Morrison, supra note 262, at 1138 (noting that reputational
considerations may be an additional constraint).
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such as in Iraq in 2003. And instances in which they have strained
domestic law—such as in Korea in 1950 and Libya in 2011—have
tended to involve situations in which they had strong international
legal support. In situations in which contemplated uses of force
appeared to have weak support in both domestic law and interna-
tional law, as with Iraq in 2003 prior to the congressional authoriza-
tion and Syria in 2013, presidents have not acted unilaterally. This
pattern suggests that even if the constraining effects of domestic and
international law are each relatively thin, they are stronger when they
are operating in the same direction. Law thus matters more when con-
sidered along two dimensions—but it does so in a way that is in ten-
sion with traditional conceptions of how bodies of law are supposed to
operate.
CONCLUSION
In order to understand the evolution of presidential war powers
in the United States, it is necessary to consider how domestic law and
international law governing the use of force have interacted over time.
Although international law does not purport to regulate domestic sep-
aration of powers, U.S. argumentation and decisionmaking con-
cerning the use of force has often been linked to international law. In
particular, presidents have drawn from international law to enhance
their domestic authority to use force, both in select instances and
through the accretion and extension of precedent. Moreover, while
U.S. separation of powers plays no direct doctrinal role in the devel-
opment of international law, it is relevant to international legal prac-
tice on the use of force, because it influences U.S. practice and the
United States plays an outsized role internationally with regard to the
use of force. Both scholarship on war powers, and efforts to reform
domestic and international decisionmaking on the use of force, need
to take better account of this interactive dynamic.
